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Johannes David's *Christian soothsayer or Christianus veridicus* (Antwerp 1603) became one of the first and most important Catholic emblem books. The heretic is reading Scripture through dark glasses – the dove of the Holy Spirit flies off, and the demonic causes and consequences of heresy are shown in the background. National Library of the Netherlands, The Hague.

How to Flatter the Laity?

Rethinking Catholic Responses to the Reformation

JUDITH POLLMANN

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This rejoinder summarises the two main questions which *Catholic Identity and the Revolt of the Netherlands, 1520-1635* seeks to address, and explains the way in which the author approached these before engaging with the points raised by the three reviewers. Noting the reviewers' appreciation for the book's emphasis on the experience of the laity and their role in the Catholic revival, the rejoinder discusses the points of criticism they raised, as well as the potential for further research. Encouraging the reader not to be deceived by the smokescreen of uniformity and hierarchy which the post-Tridentine Catholic Church has drawn up, the author suggests that we can account much more satisfactorily for the curious changes in fortune of the Catholic Church by looking beyond institutional sources, by appreciating the virtues of fragmentation and by broadening our scope to the whole of the religious landscape.

I wrote *Catholic Identity and the Revolt of the Netherlands*[1] in the hope that what I had to say might be of interest not just to students of Netherlandish history, but also to those studying the impact of Reformation and Counter-Reformation elsewhere in Europe. I am most grateful to the editors of the *BMGN-LCHR* for creating an immediate opportunity to put this expectation to the test by asking such eminent experts as Marc Forster, Barbara Diefendorf and Michael Questier to ponder what, if anything, they think students of Catholicism beyond the Low Countries might gain from this study. Obviously I am delighted to find that the reviewers indeed believe that non-Netherlandish experts too, may learn something from my book, but also see there is more work to be done if we are to apply its findings elsewhere. I will attempt to summarise briefly what I tried to achieve and how I set about this, before responding to the reviewers' assessment of how well I have succeeded in this task, and asking where this might take us in future research

Transnational questions

In the book I ask two related questions. First, why sixteenth-century Catholics responded so passively to the emergence of Protestantism; and second, why in some areas where Catholics had been very passive initially, it was nevertheless possible for the Counter-Reformation to take hold quite quickly at the end of the sixteenth century. These questions pertain not just to the Low Countries, but also to other areas in Europe. The issue of passivity has figured prominently on the agenda of historians of England, although these have rarely tried to think about it in relation to the response of traditional Christians to the Reformation elsewhere in Europe.[2] Scholars of France, the one place where many Catholics were not passive but very militant, have studied religious violence, but have often tended to treat it as the self-evident outcome of a confrontation between Calvinism and Catholicism.[3] Few of them have stopped to ask why the picture should have looked so different elsewhere in Europe – not just in the Low Countries, but also in Scotland, Bohemia, Switzerland and other places where traditional Christians were confronted with Calvinist activism. While students of the Holy Roman Empire have certainly noted that the popular Catholic response to the Reformation initially had been pretty feeble, they had, as far as I could see, not really explained why this should have been the case.[4] All in all, I concluded early on in this project that the response of traditional Christians in the Low Countries seemed to fit into a larger pattern, but that this required a better explanation that would stand up to transnational comparisons.

Things are different with regard to the second question I asked in my book, which is why the Counter-Reformation should have triumphed as quickly as it did in the Southern Netherlands after 1585. There was a traditional and very transnational answer to this question ready and waiting; the Catholic revival was the result of the reforms that the Council of Trent had instituted in the Catholic Church and, when coupled with focused state intervention, this had effected a rapid religious transformation. Developments in the recent historiography, however, alerted me to the fact that this cannot be the whole story, neither in the Low Countries nor elsewhere. Closer analysis has shown (a) that it had taken the better part of a century to implement the Tridentine decrees to the full, so that the Catholic revival thus *preceded* the

1 Judith Pollmann, *Catholic Identity and the Revolt of the Netherlands, 1520-1635* (Oxford 2011).

2 E.g. Chris Haigh, *English Reformations: Religion, Politics and Society under the Tudors* (Oxford 1993); Eamon Duffy, *The Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in England, c. 1400-1580* (New Haven 1992).

3 Mack P. Holt, 'Putting Religion Back into the French Wars of Religion', *French Historical Studies* 18 (1993) 524-551.

4 But cf. R.W. Scribner, 'Why was there no Reformation in Cologne?', *Historical Research* 49 (1976) 217-241.

implementation of the Tridentine decrees (b) that regimes like that in the Southern Netherlands did not suddenly have better judicial, financial or governmental tools by which to control the minds of their subjects than they had used in vain to stop the Reformation earlier. Scholarship increasingly suggests that throughout Europe the implementation of the Counter-Reformation was the result of negotiation[5]; but why should people have been more receptive to a Catholic revival than they had been before? Had the message changed? Or had their experiences made them more likely to accept it?

To consider these two problems in conjunction is a new step, at least in the historiography of the Low Countries. Research into the Counter-Reformation in the Southern Netherlands has traditionally used the fall of Antwerp in 1585 as its starting point. Although this makes good sense in some ways, it unwittingly also created the impression that the Catholic population of the Habsburg Netherlands after 1585 was a sort of *tabula rasa* on which state and Church could start writing at will. This was not, of course, how it really was. I was able to show in my book that at least some of the Catholic enthusiasts of the period after 1585 were the very same people who had been so 'passive' two decades earlier. By the time of the Fall of Antwerp Southern Netherlandish Catholics had a history that had been marked by two decades of religious upheaval; everyone had been confronted by the emergence of Protestantism; many Catholics had supported the Revolt; some people had themselves been Protestant but had now opted to 'reconcile'; some had spent years away from their hometowns in religious exile, while many had experienced harassment and marginalisation in the Calvinist Republics of Flanders and Brabant. Almost everyone knew of friends, relatives or neighbours who now lived abroad as religious refugees; no one could be sure that the Netherlands would remain divided. Although the situation for those in the Netherlands of course was marked by a specific set of circumstances, Netherlandish Catholics were not the only Europeans to find that religious change required a response, starting with a new name for oneself; at some point in the course of the sixteenth century the traditional Christians of sixteenth-century Europe started to call themselves 'Catholics'.

5 See e.g. Louis Châtellier, *L'Europe des dévots* (Paris 1987); Marc Forster, *The Counter-Reformation in the Villages: Religion and Reform in the Bishopric of Speyer, 1560-1720* (Ithaca, London 1992); Marie Juliette Marinus, *De Contrareformatie te Antwerpen (1585-1676). Kerkelijk leven in een grootstad* (Brussels 1995); Craig E. Harline and Eddy Put, *A Bishop's Tale: Mathias Hovius among his Flock in Seventeenth-Century Flanders* (New Haven, Conn., London 2000); Howard Louthan, *Converting Bohemia: Force and Persuasion in the Catholic Reformation* (Cambridge 2009).

Sources and choices

Asking the question how lay believers experienced these transformations is one thing, but how might one investigate this? Colleagues to whom I explained my plans were initially often sceptical, and one can see why. Ecclesiastical archives have been used for many years, and very successfully, to try and chart the trials and tribulations of early modern Catholic reform initiatives and to gauge the impact of the Counter-Reformation on lay populations. Yet they usually offer us evidence of lay believers only in so far as these engaged with the Church as an institution. The same is true for Protestant church archives, of course. Yet because institutional records are often lacking for early Calvinist and Mennonite churches, students of sixteenth-century Protestantism early on have also learned to deploy other source material. Having seen earlier in my career what results could be obtained through this route, I thought that one might usefully try to tackle Catholic history by 'Protestant methods', so to speak. For this purpose the Low Countries is a good place to start since its population, by sixteenth-century standards, was exceptionally literate. Moreover, I was fortunate in that Alastair Duke kindly shared with me a list that he had made of all the diarists, amateur chroniclers and memoirists who had written during the Revolt; to my surprise I found that the large majority of these authors were Catholic. None of these texts were published at the time but many of them had been made readily available in editions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Since then they had been read as a source for local history, but I was the first to read them as a group and in conjunction with each other. Additional material could be found in the rich tradition of urban poetics of the *rederijkerskamers* and in the published work of the anti-protestant poets Anna Bijns and Katharina Boudewyns. While these laypeople also had plenty to say about their priests, I complemented their insights with the vernacular polemics that had been produced by Netherlandish clerics, thus focusing on the changing ways in which they had tried to solicit lay support. I am very glad to find that all three reviewers agree that by using such evidence the book has indeed succeeded in 'putting the laity back into the picture', and that I have persuaded them that it is important to consider the role of 'lay initiatives' in the Catholic revival.

There was, of course, also a price to pay for this approach. By focusing on high-quality narrative sources I was limited by whatever material happened to be available. This means that some areas are much better served in the book than others; Barbara Diefendorf signals the lack of attention for the Walloon territories; she is quite right in saying that it would be useful to consider to what extent the new discourse of French priests affected the Catholicism of francophone areas. The Eastern provinces of the Seventeen Netherlands also deserve further study. I have gone where the available evidence took me, and this creates obvious gaps in my story. This also explains the urban bias signalled by Michael Questier and Marc Forster; city-dwellers were simply

much more likely to write the sort of chronicles that formed my main source of evidence and, unwittingly, this book thus confirms the existing urban bias in Netherlandish historiography. The same is true for the role of women as religious patrons, which Diefendorf signals as an omission; although this is in fact well documented in work by other scholars on the Counter-Reformation in the Southern Netherlands, it was not so much in evidence in the sources that I used (although I draw attention to the career of exile Catharina Daneels, for instance, and as polemicists women do have a role to play in my book). I have also refrained from discussing the position of Catholics in the Dutch Republic, on which there are some good recent studies.[6] This is a book about Catholics in the Habsburg Netherlands, a territory that got steadily smaller as time went on. The idea was not to be comprehensive, which would have required a much bigger book, but rather to explore what directions of thought and argument would be suggested by using a different type of evidence.

Explaining Catholic passivity

Now for results. When considering my conclusions, the reviewers have focused on different aspects. Barbara Diefendorf's review considers above all my explanation for the passivity of Netherlandish Catholics in the early decades of the Revolt. I argue that the key to explaining the contrast between the passivity of Catholics in the Low Countries and the militancy of Catholics in France lies in the attitude of their priests. I demonstrate that priests in the Netherlands, like those in other areas in Europe, thought that reform was and should remain a clerical issue; discussing it with laypeople might only give them ideas. Rather than mobilising Catholics, they presented them with a penitential view of the heresy problem; heresy was God's punishment for society's sins, for which they recommended an individual solution. Individual Christians should contemplate their own sins, and leave it to church and state to right those of the heretics. Accordingly, Netherlandish clerics, like most of their colleagues throughout Europe, refrained from mobilising Catholics against the Protestants. In France, by contrast, priests began to preach actively against the heretics and called upon Catholics to force the authorities to exterminate heresy.

6 E.g. Charles H. Parker, *Faith on the Margins: Catholics and Catholicism in the Dutch Golden Age* (Cambridge Mass., 2008); Benjamin J. Kaplan, et al. (eds.), *Catholic Communities in Protestant States: Britain and the Netherlands c.1570-1720* (Manchester 2009).

Diefendorf is persuaded by my argument that French clerics were innovative in taking this stance, and she agrees that historians of France will have to factor in that this was less of a 'natural response to religious schism' than they used to think. She also wonders though, whether the political context in which these priests operated might not have been more decisive than I make out. She points out that while French Catholics had reason to worry about the religious commitment of their Kings, Netherlandish Catholics could feel confident that the defence of the faith was in good hands with King Philip II of Spain. This, of course, is quite true. Yet I am not convinced that the situation on the ground was really that different from France; after all, urban authorities in the Netherlands were very reluctant to take action against dissenters, and in many places effectively sabotaged the heresy legislation. Like Catholics in France, Netherlandish Catholics could see the evidence of lenience all around them. Still, while it should really have been relatively easy for them to take the city governments to task in the knowledge that their overlord was on their side, they did so only very rarely. While the stance taken by their respective monarchs was thus undoubtedly significant, in that Catholic radicals in France had to challenge royal power if they resisted attempts to impose toleration, I continue to think that this cannot account for the passive response of lay Catholics in the Low Countries. To my mind, the different strategies by which the clergy opposed heresy are still the better explanation for lay militancy; Diefendorf might be well right though, that when asking why the clergy in France changed strategy, we should look at the political factor. The threat of toleration edicts from the centre probably made it more likely and urgent for them to develop a focused Catholic response.

Explaining Catholic revival

Marc Forster's review concentrates on my findings on the second question and examines the comparative potential of my explanations for the eventual Catholic revival in the Low Countries. In some respects my explanation for this is closely linked to the local situation in the Netherlands. I argue that as the Revolt radicalised and many priests were expelled, Catholics began to develop a new commitment to the defence of their faith and devised strategies to sabotage the policies of the Calvinist town governments in Flanders and Brabant. In the meantime, Catholic refugees in centres like Douai, Cologne and Liège radicalised under the influence of Jesuits and other refugee priests. Through organisations like the sodalities, laypeople were now encouraged to do their bit for their fight against heresy, and offered new formats in which to do so. Once the restoration in the South got under way, former exiles acquired a prominent role in the city governments and were in a position to further this new, activist stance in religion. Long before bishops were in a position to implement all Tridentine reforms, a growing number of partnerships between laypeople and clerics could thus begin to effect a powerful revival.

Forster points out that in Germany too, lay initiatives were important in powering the earliest manifestations of a Catholic revival, like those in Cologne and Bavaria. Yet he suggests that my ideas will need adjusting for the German lands, both because in the countryside a crucial role was played by secular village priests and because the chronology was different. In most areas a Catholic revival did not take effect until 1650. This leads him to suggest that I have 'downplayed elements of what has traditionally been called Tridentine reform'. Forster is correct that I have not said much about the impact of the decrees of Trent, but this was not because I had a particularly strong view about the role of secular priests vis-à-vis those of the Jesuit order, as he suggests. Rather, through a series of studies by Michel Cloet and his students, it is well known that reforms in the rural parishes of the Southern Netherlands did not really kick in until well after the start of the revival and in many cases, like in Germany, not until the mid-seventeenth century. This had to do with the devastations of war and an acute shortage of priests in the parishes (aspiring young priests preferring to join the glamorous new religious orders), as well as battles over income and patronage that the bishops were to win only slowly. Because this is quite familiar through the important work that Belgian scholars have done on the implementation of reform, I have not really considered it in any detail in my book; in the light of Forster's comments I accept that it might have been helpful to add a few paragraphs to point this out.[7]

For the purpose of my book, however, what really interested me was that the first concrete initiatives to bring the revival to the villages happened earlier and were often the result not of institutional reforms but of private initiatives 'from the middle', like the village missions around Antwerp that were undertaken by lay volunteers who were organised in the new confraternities. Religious orders played a direct role in the rural revival too, not least because they furnished many of the village priests in this period. In the epilogue to the book I give an example of the role played by a Norbertine who worked as village priest in Tilburg; he might just as well have been a secular priest. My point is that in these first decades Catholic reform was fragmented and leaned heavily on the forging of bonds between priests and selected, and often middle or upper class, members of the laity. To (re)build

7 These studies are discussed in James Tracy, 'With and Without the Counter Reformation: The Catholic Church in the Spanish Netherlands and the Dutch Republic, 1580-1650', *Catholic Historical Review* 71 (1985) 547-575; Michel Cloet, 'Algemeen verslag over de kerkgeschiedenis betreffende de nieuwe tijd sinds 1970', in: M. Cloet and F. Daelemans (eds.), *Godsdienst, mentaliteit en dagelijks leven: Religieuze geschiedenis in België sinds 1970* (Brussels 1988) 65-88; Guido Marnef, 'Belgian and Dutch Post-War Historiography on the Protestant and Catholic Reformation in the Netherlands', *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte* 100 (2009) 271-292.

their position in the post-Reformation world, competing priests desperately needed the support of laypeople; in return they offered them an active role in the defence of the faith, recognition of their contribution, and all the status and satisfaction that came with feeling indispensable. It was such features that at one point had attracted the educated middle classes to Protestantism. Euan Cameron concluded in 1991 that one of the main reasons for the success of the Reformation was that it 'flattered the laypeople'.[8] By the late sixteenth century, some Catholic priests had at last found a way to respond in kind.

A Catholic international?

Whereas Diefendorf and Forster have aligned their comments primarily with my two central questions, Michael Questier has identified a series of other parallels between the situation in the Netherlands and the British Isles. He is quite right that William of Orange tried to forge a modicum of acceptance of religious diversity, although he did so differently than did Queen Elizabeth, by insisting on religious parity rather than on a modification of Reformed theology. The latter option was explored in some of the 'libertine' city churches in the Dutch Republic, although not with lasting success.

Questier also sees a parallel in that both in England and the Low Countries, Catholic extremists could make the position of more moderate Catholics extremely difficult. While he is right that the criticism of the Catholic Church fed partly on the persecuting policies against heretics, the fact that it was the state that enacted these still gave this issue a different flavour than in the recusant community of Elizabethan England (a comparison with Marian England might work better). Actually, few Catholics in the provinces which joined the Revolt in 1576 did anything more extremist than to demand that the authorities abide by the agreements of the Pacification; by the time Balthasar Gerard assassinated William of Orange most of the South had already been re-conquered. There is, however, a more obvious parallel with the position of Catholics in the Dutch Republic (even if that falls outside the scope of my book). Dutch Catholics who were trying to rebuild some form of religious life in semi-clandestine obscurity were not well-served by the actions of Catholic extremists – and there were far fewer actual Catholic plots in the Republic than in England and than Calvinist ministers imagined.

Less than Questier imagines, I think, did all Netherlandish contemporaries see Habsburg rule as by definition 'Spanish' – rebel propaganda notwithstanding. The Archdukes Albert and Isabella certainly succeeded in projecting themselves as 'natural lords'. In the Netherlands it

8 Euan Cameron, *The European Reformation* (Oxford 1991) 311-313.

was never going to be so difficult for the Habsburgs to present themselves as the obvious successors to the very 'local' Burgundian dukes and the Emperor Charles V, and to style themselves as protectors of the faith. Yet I agree with Questier that there are many other parallel developments and interactions to consider. Howard Louthan's recent findings on the Catholic revival in Bohemia certainly suggest that the Austrian Habsburgs had learned all the lessons that there were to learn from the successful re-Catholicisation of the Netherlands, whereas a recent collection of essays has considered the Southern Netherlands as a 'point of contact' for British and Dutch Catholics with the Catholic world at large.[9] Questier is quite right that it would be very worthwhile for us to consider more systematically the existence of a Catholic equivalent of the 'Protestant cause'; many Catholic opinion and policy makers were thinking and operating 'internationally', and not necessarily so under the guidance of, or in the interest of, the Papacy. That is, however, a story for someone else to tell.

The virtues of fragmentation

I am very grateful that much of what I have tried to achieve with this book, in some way or another, does resonate among experts on other parts of early modern Europe, and might, with many refinements and revisions, encourage a rethink of the role of the laity in the fortunes of the Catholic Church. The seductive riches of Catholic ecclesiastical archives have kept too many students of Catholicism away from exploring other routes to study lay experience. Although the literate, urban Netherlands are perhaps exceptionally well served with sources for lay Catholic thought, I think that there is more to be had elsewhere than scholars often imagine. No historian of Catholicism, for instance, has used the wonderful *Hausbuch* of Herman Weinsberg from Cologne to explore how a traditional Catholic responded to religious change. It is typical that it was Steven Ozment, a historian of Protestantism, who in a brief sketch noticed its potential for doing so.[10]

Yet we should not just think more about the laity in isolation or as an end in itself. I hope the book will also inspire colleagues to try and think of the ecclesiastical landscape as it was experienced by individual believers, both lay and clerical. The post-Tridentine Church has always believed that any success it achieved was owing to it being united and hierarchical. Wedded to their own fantasies about an all-powerful authoritarian enemy, the Church's critics, and many secular historians, have not realised that the notion of a centralised and uniform Church has never been more than a smokescreen. Throughout

9 Louthan, *Converting Bohemia*; Kaplan, *Catholic communities*.

10 Steven Ozment, *Protestants: The Birth of a Revolution* (London 1992) 181-192.

the *Ancien Régime*, control over clerical appointments and of finances was never centralised and continued to depend on a myriad of forces and factors, including fragmented jurisdictions, the battle for lay and clerical patronage, the jostling for power between different orders, secular and regular priests and the local authorities. Catholic reform therefore could not be imposed from the centre. Reform had to be mediated by people in the middle, both lay and clerical, who for that purpose formed partnerships which were mutually beneficial. Since there were many clerical providers on the market, reform was fragmented and had to be elitist enough for select laypeople to feel 'special' in collaborating with each other and with individual priests for religious purposes. This could happen and be meaningful at many levels; a peasant woman would never act as patron of a new religious order, but by joining a confraternity with other village worthies she might very well mark her status in her community. Historians of Catholicism have often seen fragmentation and dependency on decentralised private initiatives as some sort of 'defect'. I believe that, at least in the Netherlands, it was in fact a major factor in the revival's success. By broadening our scope to the whole of the religious landscape, looking beyond institutional sources, with a keen eye for the religious choices great and small made by both priests and laypeople, I believe it should be possible to account much more satisfactorily for the curious changes in fortune of the Catholic Church. ◀

Judith Pollmann is Professor of the History of the Early Modern Netherlands at Leiden University. She has published widely on the religious, cultural and political history of the early modern Low Countries. She is the director of the NWO VICI project *Tales of the Revolt: Memory, Oblivion and identity in the Low Countries, 1566-1700* and is currently working on a book project provisionally entitled 'Memory beyond Modernity'. Recent publications include *Catholic Identity and the Revolt of the Netherlands, 1520-1635* (Past & Present Book Series; Oxford UP 2011); 'Een 'blij-eindend' treurspel. Herinneringen aan het beleg van Leiden, 1574-2011', in: H. van Amersfoort et al. (eds.), *Belaagd en belegerd* (Amsterdam 2011) 118-145 and 'No Man's Land. Reinventing Netherlandish Identities, 1585-1621', in: Robert Stein and Judith Pollmann (eds.), *Networks, Regions and Nations: Shaping Identities in the Low Countries, 1300-1650* (Leiden 2010) 241-261.

Recensies

Algemeen

Dissel, Anita van, Groen, Petra, ***In de West. De Nederlandse krijgsmacht in het Caribisch gebied*** (Franeker: Van Wijnen, Den Haag: Nederlands Instituut voor Militaire Historie, 2010, 165 blz., ISBN 978 90 5194 386 3).

Wie *In de West. De Nederlandse krijgsmacht in het Carabisch gebied* tot zich neemt, ontkomt niet aan een bepaald gevoel: Nederland heeft de verantwoordelijkheid over de Nederlandse Antillen eerder als een blok aan het been ervaren, dan als een enthousiasmerend rentmeesterschap van een koloniale parel. Curaçao (dat in 1634 feitelijk in bezit kwam van de West-Indische Compagnie) was tot in de negentiende eeuw nog wel de moeite waard om te exploiteren. Nederland bestuurde de Antillen echter onmiskenbaar met een aanzienlijke achteloosheid. Tegelijk was het rigoureus afstoten van de zes eilanden blijkbaar geen optie, met name vanwege de Nederlandse reputatie als grote koloniale mogendheid. Koning Willem I zette zich na 1815 aan een plan om van Curaçao een soort vrijhaven zoals Malta te maken. De Belgische opstand haalde dit tamelijk megalomane project al snel in. Vooral na de Tweede Wereldoorlog waren het bovenal de Verenigde Staten en de Antilliaanse bestuurders zelf die erop aandrongen dat Den Haag verantwoordelijk bleef voor de verdediging van de eilanden en de ordehandhaving. Nederland zag de Antillen echter liefst zo snel mogelijk onafhankelijk worden. Zoals bekend, mondde deze knellende context inmiddels uit in een ingewikkelde staatkundige constructie van 'status aparte', 'landen' en 'bijzondere gemeenten'. Hoe moeizaam dit verloopt, is haast dagelijks in het nieuws te volgen.

Anita van Dissel en Petra Groen (beiden verbonden aan het Nederlands Instituut voor Militaire Historie) tekenden deze boeiende geschiedenis van de Antillen op. *In de West* legt de nadruk op de Nederlandse militaire aanwezigheid op en rond de eilanden sinds 1634. Wie iets weet van koloniale defensie en ordehandhaving herkent al snel vertrouwde patronen. Ten eerste mocht het allemaal niet te veel kosten. Het primaat lag hoe dan ook in Europa. Ten tweede was het gebrek aan mankracht chronisch. Het tropische klimaat, ziektes en verveling maakten de dienst in de West bepaald niet tot een pretje. De kwaliteit van de 'ingehuurde' inheemse militairen bleef bovendien ver onder de maat. De uiteindelijk in 1961 ingevoerde dienstplicht bleek geen succes: de Antilliaanse autoriteiten zagen hierin hoofdzakelijk een veredeld werkgelegenheidsproject. Ten derde betekende de ordehandhavingstaak in de praktijk het ad hoc optreden tegen *acute* ongeregeldheden. Een tekenend voorbeeld is de revolte (eigenlijk een uit de hand gelopen arbeidsconflict) van 1969, die met hulp van mariniers werd neergeslagen. Een ronduit fascinerende episode speelde trouwens veertig jaar eerder. De Venezolaanse avonturier Rafael Simon Urbina zette toen Nederland in zijn hemd door met een groep ballingen het Waterfort op Curaçao te overvallen.

De krijgsmacht voelde zich weinig senang met de niet erg eervolle en doorgaans saaie politietaak, waaraan bovendien al snel het odium van '(neo-) koloniaal' gedrag kleefde. Met name de Koninklijke Marine smeekte de regering in Den Haag om een gedegen strategisch plan. Dit kwam er niet echt. Een enkele keer viel Nederland terug op ouderwetse *gunboat diplomacy* tegen de onrustige Venezolaanse republiek. Na 1959 kwam ook het communistische Cuba in beeld als potentiële dreiging. De Amerikanen drongen voortdurend aan

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