

The North Sea in Wartime (1688-1713)

J. S. BROMLEY

Introducing extracts from the king-stadholder's correspondence with Heinsius, Leopold von Ranke observed that 'brought together in anything like completeness and sufficiently elucidated, it would be a history of the age'¹. Anyone who has broken the seal of the confidential letters of Marlborough and Godolphin to each other between 1701 and 1710 must feel likewise². And yet how much remains to be elucidated! How recall the once passionate drama in such dead questions as the Protestant Succession or the Barrière? Louis XIV, especially if we have pro-French inclinations, has become so much less threatening than the Jacobin crusade or the Napoleonic tyranny; indeed, the more we have been taught of the party strife in countries opposed to him, the more sympathetic do we risk becoming to the rationality and courtesies, if also at times the despair, that inform the correspondence of the Great King's servants. When the political quarrelling is analysed, much of it is found to revolve round personal, local or at best domestic issues which strike us as trivial by comparison with the foresight and single-mindedness of a William III. His stature, like that of Godolphin, is increased by the trouble they caused him, so that we can admire the man without fully sharing his inspiration. But correspondingly, historical justice to the troublemakers - particularly perhaps to the Dutch *vredesvrienden* (peace party) - requires that fuller account be taken of the relentless, day-to-day pressure of two long wars on civilian life. 'War-weariness' is too often a historian's *deus ex machina*, a phrase empty of living content, supported at best by reference to crushing taxes, the alarming growth of public borrowing, strategie or diplomatic stalemate, the distortion of international traffic. My purpose now is to address your minds to this last element, which had moral besides economic implications.

The North Sea, with its crowded shipping lanes of great antiquity, is intimately known to us and I need not spend time describing the tightly woven tapestry of the

* Revised from a lecture delivered to the general meeting of the Nederlands Historisch Genootschap on 8 October 1976 at Utrecht. I am deeply grateful to Prof. dr. J. C. Boogman and to drs. G. N. van der Plaats for assistance in preparing the text for publication.

1. *A History of England* (6 vols., Oxford, 1875) VI, 277.

2. See Henry L. Snyder, ed., *The Marlborough - Godolphin Correspondence* (3 vols., Oxford, 1975).

trades which united it. Enough to remind you that its shores embraced Europe's two greatest ports at this time, Amsterdam and London, and that over three-quarters of England's shipping tonnage, as well as most of Scotland's, was owned on the coast which faces yours. In our economy it had much greater relative importance still than it was to have as the eighteenth century, with the expansion of colonial trade, wore on. And in the period I have chosen it linked two allies whose most sustained effort through two long wars was made in the Spanish Low Countries, with all that this implies for the safe passage of troops, supplies, remittances and not least of vital correspondence. It happened that these, like all the trades and fisheries of the area, were continuously threatened by the presence in our midst of the naval base of Dunkirk, with its old experience of warfare on commerce and the most belligerent of French corsairs, at a time when the *guerre de course* was prosecuted with as much vigour and optimism as the submarine wars of our own century. For these reasons alone, the North Sea, a dangerous one at all times, can offer us some sort of case-study of the impact of war, so much neglected by the economic historians. In studying it, moreover, we are able to take account of the role taken by the neutral shipping of Denmark and Sweden, especially when there was no licit trading with the enemy. This was extremely important during the Nine Years War, and again in 1703-1704, when William III and his political heirs managed to impose an unprecedented embargo on Dutch trade with France, thereby dislocating Holland's 'mother commerce' with the Baltic. Not only that: William began by attempting also to prohibit all Scandinavian trade with France - an act of economic warfare more audacious, I believe, than anything of its kind before the age of Napoleon. So we shall need to look a little beyond the North Sea, into the Baltic and the Bay of Biscay, if we are to judge the impact of twenty years' life- and-death struggle upon those who lived around it.

First, a necessary word of caution. War, we know, works with paradoxical effects on an economy, stimulating sectors concerned with military supplies and protecting others from normal competition³, while tending to create scarcities, raise costs, and alter the preferences of investors almost from year to year. At the same time, a total war economy was unthinkable in this period of limited State power, even if William took certain steps towards it, as in initiating the treatment of corn as contraband when the French were starving in 1693. Indeed, the business and personal lives of Europeans stood to be more direly affected by a bad harvest - or a run of poor harvests such as afflicted Scotland in the 1690s - than by war itself. Within terms of the incidence of war itself, London prices in those years reflect both the national debt and the contrary (deflationary) action of a drain of capital

3. For examples (e.g. in metallurgical production) in this period, see A. H. John, 'War and the English Economy, 1700-1763', *Economic History Review*, 2nd ser. VII (1954-1955) 329-344.

to the Continent, which in turn enabled English exporters to cash their bills more quickly from the remittance specialists than from foreign customers, while it contributed in the Dutch Republic to a price-rise⁴. That Dutch prices nevertheless followed a downward path in 1702-1708 but rose sharply in 1709-1710, as did the English, perhaps tells us more about the state of the harvests than that of the war, although we must allow something for the course of events in the Baltic, where the repercussions of Tsar Peter's victory at Poltava were combined from 1709 with a visitation of the plague to make trading conditions more difficult than they had been since 1700, the first year of those northern hostilities to which historians too often attribute a kind of blanket effect, with insufficient regard for the tides of war: these short-term fluctuations are concealed by the habit of taking decennial averages⁵. As a general index to the pressure of war on the United Provinces, the activity of the specie trade seems preferable to the controversial evidence of prices, despite the fact that it must tell us something about all the belligerents and in particular which side Spain was on. Measured by the metal reserves of the Bank of Amsterdam, the Spanish Succession War exerted a much harder strain than all but the last two years of its predecessor. Still more significant, for the leading centre of international payments, the scale of discounting, though not always of the total balances or the number of account-holders, follows closely the curve of the metal reserves⁶. Moreover there is a broad concordance between this and the Amsterdam shipping figures.

Here, since I do not wish to weary you with statistics, let us be content to notice a marked dip for the first two or three years of each war and another one as the wars drag to a finish; but with the difference that the second and longer war shows a more depressed profile, unrelieved by any striking recovery such as occurred in 1693-1695. What figures we have for English ports show a rather different pattern: a truly

4. J. Keith Horsefield, *British Monetary Experiments, 1650-1710* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960) 5-12; D. W. Jones, 'London Merchants and the Crisis of the 1690s' in P. Clark and P. Slack, edd., *Crisis and Order in English Towns 1500-1700* (London, 1972) 322-327; N. W. Posthumus, *De geschiedenis van de Leidsche lakenindustrie*, II (The Hague, 1939) 1001, 1010, 1142.

5. Yearly numbers of ships (both ways) paying Sound tolls, according to N. E. Bang and K. Korst, *Tabelier over Skibsfart og Varetransport gennem Øresund, 1661-1783 ...*, I (Copenhagen, 1930) 42-55:

1700 = 2,866;	1701 = 3,193;	1702 = 2,828;	1703 = 2,415
1704 = 2,994;	1705 = 2,821;	1706 = 2,913;	1707 = 2,524
1708 = 2,664;	1709 = 2,296;	1710 = 1,413;	1711 = 1,600
1712 = 1,626;	1713 = 2,293;	1714 = 2,466;	1715 = 1,561
1716 = 1,236;	1717 = 1,091;	1718 = 1,309;	1719 = 1,943
1720 = 2,417.			

6. J. G. van Dillen, *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis der wisselbanken*, II (The Hague, 1925) 985; cf. the graph at p. 392 in *idem*, *Mensen en achtergronden* (Groningen, 1964). The figures are conveniently printed in *The New Cambridge Modern History*, VI (Cambridge, 1970) 902.

sensational drop in the Nine Years War but a more modest one later, also with a tendency to recover towards the end of each war⁷. Unless Amsterdam's trade was considerably more vulnerable to privateering attack than England's - I will look into this later - the explanation of this broad contrast is likely to be found in what was happening to the city's Baltic connections. We can hardly fail to be impressed by the drastic decline in Dutch sailings through the Danish Sound during the Nine Years War⁸. Only in 1700 were they affected by the outbreak of the Great Northern War, so the decline is most likely attributable to the virtual cessation of Holland's complementary trade with western France in wines, brandies and salt. What is harder to interpret are the still lower levels of these sailings in the next war, after 1705, when an open trade with the French ports (under passes issued by Versailles) was resumed on a large scale until 1710, at the end of which year the French government stopped it, at some cost to its own exporters, in order to force the Republic to make a separate peace. What contrivances Dutch merchants adopted for maintaining some shadow of this almost essential traffic I hope to study in more detail on a later occasion. It is clear enough, however, that many of them 'coloured' cargoes to France during the years of prohibition on board neutral ships, if they did not also own the ships themselves. To understand this, I must next turn briefly to the Scandinavians themselves.

The fact is that the northern neutrals moved into the carriage of French salt, wines and brandies for themselves, on a wholly unprecedented scale, from 1691, after the Allies had abandoned the attempt to bring them into their own blockade - so much so that the Danes by 1695 were said to be losing their taste for Rhenish and even beer⁹. The clearance of two hundred Swedish bottoms from Bordeaux alone in the two wine-years 1703-1705 may come as a surprise to anyone who supposes that the war in Poland absorbed all Sweden's shipping resources. During the 1690s these had increased to 'no less than 750 ships'¹⁰. Like the Swedish, the

7. Graphs for *convoyen* and *licenten*, incoming vessels and *lastgeld* in *Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden*, VII (Utrecht, 1954) 313; table of English clearances in Ralph Davis, *The Rise of the English Shipping Industry* (London, 1962) 26.

8. Bang and Korst, *Tabeller*, I, 38 ff., 147 ff.; cf. 10-yearly averages tabled in A. M. van der Woude, *Het Noorderkwartier* (A. A. G. Bijdragen, XVI; 3 vols., Wageningen, 1972) II, 383.

9. Oscar Albert Johnsen, *Innberetninger fra den franske legasjon i Kjøbenhavn vedrorende Norge 1670-1791*, I (Oslo: Norsk Historisk Kjeldekrift-Instituut, 1934) 201-202. Cf. Bang and Korst, *Tabeller*, I, 30 ff. for figures of ships out of French ports (expressed as 3-year averages). If only because of Danish and Swedish holdings on the Elbe, to say nothing of Norway and Gothenburg, their figures understate the Nordic trade with France. For example, departures from Bordeaux alone (admittedly far the most important) in the wine-year (1 Oct. - 30 Sept.) 1704-1705 totalled 36 for Denmark, 33 for Norway, 119 for Sweden, and 9 for Danzig: C. Huetz de Lemps, *Géographie du commerce de Bordeaux à la fin du règne de Louis XIV* (Paris-The Hague, 1975) 63. Cf. my article, 'Le commerce de la France de l'ouest et la guerre maritime, 1702-1712', *Annales du Midi*, LXV (1953) 49-65, where the statistics relate to calendar years.

10. E. F. Heckscher, *An Economic History of Sweden* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954) 113-114.

Norwegian and Danish marines had long been stimulated, at Dutch expense, by the English Navigation Acts; but the Nine Years War imparted a much stronger boost: Danish tonnage virtually doubled between 1688 and 1696, while the Norwegian expanded nearly threefold¹¹. These merchant fleets entered the French trade in strength, moreover, just when they were called upon to carry a much higher proportion of timber, naval stores, iron and copper to their principal markets in the Texel, Thames, Humber, Tyne and Forth¹². The wars of the Grand Alliance presented them with an unprecedented opportunity. Almost the only point on which the Northern Crowns co-operated, although by no means without friction, was to provide each a warship, two or three times a year, for their joint convoys to Dunkirk and beyond. In the winter of 1693-1694 Jean Bart himself came to the rendezvous at Flekkør ('Vlecker' on the old Dutch maps, at the entrance to Christiansand sound), and there are indications that Danish corn-shippers would have liked more such escorts, even if there were runners who preferred to sail under Ostend colours and get themselves captured, collusively, by Dunkirk privateers - a method which sometimes suited the Holsteiners and the Danish communities on the Elbe, at Glückstadt and Altona (and Swedish Stade on the opposite bank), which were subject to Imperial law and consequently to the *avocatoria* prohibiting trade with France¹³. I have no French figures for the Nine Years War, but in the eighteen months June 1703-December 1704, there were entered at Bordeaux alone no less than 66 vessels from Stockholm and 42 from other ports under Swedish domination, 41 from Copenhagen, 45 from Norway, and 29 from the little ports of Slesvig-Holstein. By 1712 (again without Dutch competition) these last, to the number of 53, are virtually the only Scandinavian survivors in the Gironde - sad testimony now to the maritime hostilities, outside as well as within the Sound, between the Northern Crowns¹⁴. Just when the French Crown embarked on an extremely rigorous economic blockade of the United Provinces at the end of 1710, the Northern marines had at last begun to cripple each other.

11. Respectively, 23,799 and 40,319 *laester* in 1696: Jørgen H. P. Barfod, *Danmark-Norges Handelsflåde 1650-1700* (Kronborg, 1967) 86-87, 160-197. Cf. Bengt Lorentzen, *Bergen og Sjøfarten*, I (Bergen, 1959) 245; P. J. Charliat, ed., 'Mémoires inédits de thor Møhlen à la cour de France', *Bergens - Historiske Forening*, XXXIII (1927) 11; Wilhelm Keilhau, *Norway and the Bergen Line* (Bergen, 1953) 35-36.

12. R. Davis, *The Rise of the English Shipping Industry* (London, 1962) 334-336; B. Boëthius and E. F. Heckscher, *Svensk Handelsstatistik 1637-1737* (Stockholm, 1937) lv; T. C. Smout, *Scottish Trade on the Eve of Union 1660-1707* (Edinburgh, 1963) 153-161.

13. Under conventions dated 10 Maren 1691 and 27 March 1693: see G. N. Clark, *The Dutch Alliance and the War against French Trade 1688-1697* (Manchester, 1923) 103-105; Charliat, 'Mémoires inédits', 314; Johnsen, *Imberetninger*, 75, 99, 106-107, 129-139, 164, 196.

14. Bordeaux, A(rchives) D (épartementales de la) Gironde, 6B 124 and 125: 'Lettres de mer', 28 June 1703 - 24 Dec. 1704 and 6 Nov. 1711-12 Nov. 1712. Cf. Huetz de Lempis, *Géographie*, 63, for departures 1703-1705: Swedish total 198; Danish-Norwegian 128; Slesvig-Holstein 52.

I have emphasised this Scandinavian intervention in the Biscay trade not only as a comment on the failure of the king-stadholder's precocious conception of economic warfare, but because without it - and that of the Hanseatics - the privateers of south-east England, Zeeland and even Dunkirk would have had a poorer time of it and spared all the belligerent powers a sequence of diplomatic embarrassments, not to mention the fierce rows which blew up between The Hague and Middelburg over the 'political' suspensions ('surcheances') of prize cases in 1703-1705, before Zeeland valour was bought off by a doubling of the premium awarded for capturing enemy warships on any sea¹⁵. Although most of the arrested neutrals, with or without their cargoes, were released in the end, the interruption of their voyages could be prolonged, expensive and embittering, not least when princes and their ministers had a stake in the cargoes, as was true of all Danish ministers, or when the privateers exploited technical faults in passports approved by them¹⁶. When corn was unilaterally added by the Maritime Powers to the contraband list, in 1693 and 1709, arrested cargoes were taken out and paid for; but often, in other cases, on the plea of just cause of seizure, owners failed to recover costs and damages¹⁷. In the Nine Years War, not least whenever there was a harvest failure in France, the English navy took a big hand. In fact, the High Court of Admiralty had far more neutral cases to try than even the *Conseil des Prises*, while in this respect the prize business of the admiralty at Middelburg, for all the embarrassment it created at

15. I may refer to my article 'Les corsaires zélandais et la navigation scandinave pendant la guerre de la succession d'Espagne', in M. Mollat, ed., *Le navire et l'économie maritime de l'Europe* (Paris, 1960) 93-109. These disputes did not reach flash-point in the time of the king-stadholder, though he complained of the Zeelanders and sometimes cancelled their commissions.

16. *Ibidem*, 93-95. The many ambiguities surrounding the authenticity of Danish passes are conveniently summarized by Hugh Greg, the British *chargé d'affaires* at Copenhagen 1692-1701, in P(ublic) R(ecord) O(ffice), SP 75/23, fos. 16-22, 28-31; cf. copy of his 'present thoughts' (early 1694) in Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawl. A 345, fos. 245-250, containing an analysis of Danish obligations under the *traité provisionnel* of 30 June 1691, as modified by Van Amerongen's seven 'elucidations and amplifications' before ratification of the Convention on 25 December. D'Usson de Bonrepas, French ambassador at Copenhagen 1693-1697, expressed admiration for Amerongen's cleverness, in a retrospective 'Relation des négociations d'Usson de Bonrepas', Archives des Affaires Etrangères, Danemark 36, fos. 24-26 v. Cf. S. P. Oakley's unpublished London Ph.D. thesis, 'William III and the Northern Crowns during the Nine Years War' (2 vols., 1961) especially ch. vi-vii.

17. 'Just cause of seizure' occurs frequently in the judgements of the *Conseil des Prises*. The English attitude to demands for compensation was stated by the Admiralty judge Sir Charles Hedges (PRO, SP 75/23, fo. 127 v.): 'That the Crown of England is not answerable for the actions of the Privateers ... where the parties who pretended to be injured ... shall prosecute them for satisfaction'. Instead, complainants too often resorted to diplomatic protests: half a dozen examples in PRO, SP 75/23, fos. 106, 109, 112. If the captor was a naval ship, on the other hand, the Privy Council might order release of a prize before it came into court at all: *ibidem*, fos. 109v-110: 'The Arms of Frederickshall, Olafsen, and 'The Gilded Unicorn', Tortensen, both discharged by the Prize Officers.

The Hague, looks modest enough by comparison with either¹⁸. There is no parallel to Admiral Rooke's seizure of an entire Swedish convoy of 90 sail in 1697; and as many Swedes had been awaiting judgment in London in March 1694, when also the Dutch held 50 and the French 30¹⁹. This is an untypical year because so many of the Allies' interceptions in 1694 were cornships, while at the same time the States General were freely arresting Danes in Dutch harbours by way of reprisals for the stopping of a score of 'Great Flyboats' at Elsinore²⁰, so let me also mention a list of 71 claims put in by Christian von Lente, Danish Resident at The Hague, on 21 May 1693 to the British government; although it is true that 34 of these vessels were restored or discharged, Lente omitted 61 others which had been confiscated - a total of condemnations in London to date, therefore, of 97, mostly with the cargoes²¹. With others still to come²² - and with the Dutch abandoning for Denmark, though not for Sweden, their old principle of 'free ships, free goods' - it does not look as if the judicious d'Usson de Bonrepaus, looking back on his disappointing embassy to Copenhagen (1693-1697), was exaggerating all that much when he wrote that the Maritime Powers had arrested nearly all Danes bound to France in these years²³.

This, he thought, they owed to the 'elucidations' cleverly added by Van Amerongen to their Convention with Denmark of 1691, renewed in 1696 and far more oppressive than the earlier treaties of the Maritime Powers with Sweden, which Stockholm refused to revise: for instance, Danes, but not Swedes, would be protected only when carrying to an enemy port - and this directly there and back - goods that 'do really belong and without any Collusion belong to real Danish subjects, living without the bounds of the Empire, and sworn to ...'. Thus, strictly, the Swedes could carry Danish goods, but not *vice versa*; and foreign masters,

18. *Infra*, n. 114. The admiralty board admitted that it might err under pressure of business: Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague (ARA), Staten Generaal, Admiraliteitsarchieven 2525, 26 March 1704.

19. Clark, *Dutch Alliance*, 113-114.

20. The circumstances are detailed by Greg, PRO, SP 75/23, fos. 270-282. *The London Gazette*, no. 2949 (12 Feb. o.s. 1694), reported the seizure of between 30 and 40 Danish ships at Amsterdam. On cornships taken into Dover by English privateers, cf. *ibidem* nos. 2937-2938 (1 and 5 Jan. o.s. 1694).

21. PRO, SP 75/23 fos. 101-113, 248-249; 34 names in Lente's list appeared on a similar one presented by Scheel, Danish Resident in London, on 9 May o.s. 1692 (on which a copy of Hedges's comments is in the Bodleian Library, MS. Rawl. A 345, fos. 297-301), but not in Scheel's list of 15 ships of 4 Jan. o.s. 1692/1693 (SP 75/23, fos. 3-4). Cf. Hedges to Nottingham, 26 May o.s. 1692, London, British Library (Reference Division), Add. MS. 9764, fos. 19-29.

22. The notes by Owen Wynne in Codrington Library, Oxford, Wynne MSS. LR2 E23, for July 1694 to Oct. 1695, sum up the arguments of the parties in dispute: on 27 July 1694, when 39 Danes were restored (some upon bail and time to prove property), the Danish Resident was present in court.

23. 'Relation Bonrepaus'.

owners and freighters, to comply with the Convention, would have to take an oath to reside in Denmark-Norway, with their families, for ten years²⁴. Diplomacy in the northern capitals in this period had a dramatic quality all its own, but clearly the twin realm was much more vulnerable than Sweden to pressure from the Maritime Powers, as we are again reminded by their dictation of a settlement over Gottorp at Altona in 1689 and Travendal in 1700²⁵. At Stockholm they had to rely on Bengt Oxenstierna, the powerful if greedy chancellor, to resist a strong French party and to thwart Danish initiatives there for an armed neutrality. When the Maritime Powers sought a new commercial treaty with Sweden, they got nothing better than a renewal of the 1661 treaty with England, and that not until 1693, with a promise to compensate for ships and goods taken up²⁶.

This harsh contrast is the more ironical when mercantilist Sweden's high-handed treatment of foreign merchants is compared with poor Denmark's dependence on them. Bonrepaus had not lived six months in Copenhagen before remarking that fresh meat was served in only a dozen houses there²⁷. The city's economic build-up belongs to the eighteenth century. As yet agricultural produce, with cattle and horses on the hoof, from Jutland or Holstein, was about all the country had to export. Its trade deficit with Europe was balanced by Norway's sawn and mast timber, skins, stockfish and trainoil, with some inferior tar and copper; in wartime too, Bergen's shipowners developed an entrepot traffic in wines and brandies. But the sister-realm herself was chronically short of credit. Scottish and Dutch skippers bought most of their supplies for cash at the loading-places; English importers more often paid in bills but extended long credit and bore all shipping charges - in the case of timber always a high proportion of the total landed cost²⁸. Until the great débâcle of 1710 in the North, it is true, Norway's (and especially Bergen's)

24. Greg's 'thoughts', Bodleian Library, MS. Rawl. A 345, fo. 249. He does not regard as essential the ambassadorial 'recommendatory letters' for which the Convention provided; Bonrepaus admitted his incapacity to issue these 'lettres d'accompagnement' on any sound basis, but the Danes pressed for them (Johnsen, *Innberetninger*, 81-82, 144 ff., 177-178, 210).

25. See Preben Torntoft, 'William III and Denmark-Norway, 1697-1702', *English Historical Review*, CCCXVIII (1966) 1-25; R. M. Hatton, *Charles XII of Sweden* (London, 1968) 21-22, 60-63, 86, 99-118, 125-139.

26. Clark, *Dutch Alliance*, 101-106, 112-113; cf. 'Relation Bonrepaus', fos. 27-29, and Greg's dispatches in PRO, SP 75/23, fos. 243-250.

27. Johnsen, *Innberetninger*, 91.

28. Smout, *Scottish Trade*, 154-158; J. Le Moine de l'Espine, *Le négoce d'Amsterdam*, in Lucas Jansen, *De koophandel van Amsterdam* (Amsterdam, 1946) 382; H. S. K. Kent, 'The Anglo-Norwegian Timber Trade in the Eighteenth Century', *Economic History Review*, 2nd ser. VIII (1955-1956) 67-69. De l'Espine mentions other Dutch exports, but most of these depended on the existence of a French and Spanish trade with the United Provinces. The Scots might take corn when they had it; the Orkneys relied on the Norwegian market to take their surplus (Smout, *Scottish Trade*, 51, 75, 81, 154). Kent, 'Anglo-Norwegian Timber Trade', 71, gives figures of deal imports to London and the outports, respectively 16,500 and 11,000 Hundreds in 1700; 16,000 and 7,500 in 1706; but only 10,000 and 4,000 in 1710.

earnings from freights and charterparties enjoyed a wartime boom, thanks to the new openings in Biscay, the increased carriage of its English trade, and some substitution for Dutch carriers. On the other hand, timber exports were not what they had been *ca.* 1650; the fisheries suffered from poor catches in the 1690s; and well before the great fire of 1702 destroyed the *Kontoir* at Bergen, Jørgen thor Møhlen's famous industrial enterprises had come to grief in his West Indian ventures and an issue of paper notes which he could not honour, magnate as he was²⁹.

How in all these circumstances was Denmark-Norway to finance its expanding French trade? The corn shipped to France in time of dearth was handled with advances from Paris or Rouen by a few Copenhagen merchants whose very names tell a tale: de la Sablière, Pallacios, Samuel Teixeira, Jacob Abensoer . . . Pallacios and Teixeira were correspondents of an operator called Alvarez at Danzig; Abensoer, who also contracted for gunpowder and naval stores, came to Copenhagen in 1691 from Altona and represented Polish interests there at a time when he had six ships condemned by the prize court in London³⁰. Such men, doubtless scenting the enormous potential of the neutral carriers, owned ships in partnership with Theodor Balthasar von Jessen, head of the Tyske Kancelli (1688-1700), and others of the Danish court; their ships and cargoes appear in the prize courts of all the belligerents³¹. But were they always the true owners? Bonrepaus, who did his best to encourage their French connections, tells us in a pregnant passage³²:

J'y ay découvert de quelle maniere cela se fait. Un Hollandois ou un Hambourgeois vient dans une ville de Dannemark, et suppose par une obligation simulée qu'il a presté une somme à un marchand danois; cette somme est employée à l'achapt d'un vaisseau, de marchandises ou autres choses qui leur conviennent, sous le nom d'un Danois qui fait ensuite le serment que le tout luy appartient et est pour son compte; mais avant que le chargement parte, il fait une rétrocession à l'étranger qui luy a presté cette somme, moyennant quelque petit intérêt qu'il conserve dans ce chargement que l'étranger luy donne, tant en considération de ce qu'il luy a presté son nom, que pour l'engager à réclamer le vaisseau, en cas qu'il soit pris par les corsaires français.

29. Keilhau, *Norway*, 38; F. N. Stagg, *North Norway* (London, 1952) 99 ff. Johnsen prints thor Møhlen's fantastic proposals in 1699 for a European trading company to be financed by the French government (*Innberetninger*, 244-251, 259-261, 264-265); cf. Charliat, 'Mémoires inédits', 314.

30. PRO, SP 75/23, fos. 104-105; cf. Johnsen, *Innberetninger*, esp. 44, 48, 62-64, 68-69, 74. Details of other merchants in *ibidem*, 101, 114, 117, 119, 131, 138, 140, 152, 172, 173, 177. Bonrepaus listed 21 Copenhagen merchants trading with France, one of whom (Edinger) also worked for the Allies: Charliat, 'Mémoires inédits', 318 ff.

31. For claims of Jessen and Reventlow (the chief minister) from the French see Johnsen, *Innberetninger*, 99, 108, 116, 145-146, 176; and from the English, PRO, SP 75/24, fo. 111v. Cf. Add. MSS. 24107, fo. 138 on the release of 'a small parcel' of wines, etc. claimed by Jessen and Count Joachim Ahlfeld: 'I think it is a respect due to their quality' (Hedges to Trumbull, 15 Oct. o.s. 1697).

32. To Pontchartrain, 30 Sept. 1693: Johnsen, *Innberetninger*, 98.

It might be amusing to know more about the mechanism of these fictitious sales: to know for instance how far the well-worn insurance tracks to Amsterdam and Hamburg facilitated them, or bottomry bonds for the ships³³. As Bonrepaus also observed, the 1691 Convention, by confining Danish trade with France to Danish subjects, forced them in effect to lend their names and flag to the enemy³⁴. They could neither have financed this trade alone nor dispense with the accumulated business knowledge and connections of the Dutch and Hamburgers at their French destinations, least of all Bordeaux, where even the more strongly placed Swedes had no consul till 1705³⁵.

That is a cardinal date in this story, marking a resumption of the Franco-Dutch traffic for the first time in these wars - at the rate of 2,000 vessels a year according to the authoritative *Conseil de Commerce* in Paris. My own count of the French passports utilized suggests a much lower overall figure³⁶, but it is high enough to imply an immense demand on the neutral carriers over the years when the Dutch were forbidden. When the Dutch did return to Bordeaux in strength, moreover, they came from all parts of Holland and also from Zierikzee, although hardly at all from Middelburg and Vlissingen, for whose capers Biscay steadily remained a favourite cruising-ground³⁷. Even then, as the Sound registers indicate³⁸, there

33. One-eighth of 'The Jung Frow Hellena', a Swede condemned as Dutch on 23 Oct. o.s. 1695 (Wynne MSS., LR 2 E. 23), was alleged to have been mortgaged to an Amsterdammer.

34. 'Relation Bonrepaus', fo. 25.

35. Paris, A(rchives) N(ationales), F¹² 51, fo. 402v.: *Conseil de Commerce, proces verbal*, 5 May 1705.

36. *Ibidem*, 51, fo. 399 (21 April 1706) and 54, fo. 158 (23 March 1708); *Annales du Midi*, LXV (1953) 66. The totals for Bordeaux, La Rochelle and Nantes (easily the most important of French ports for this trade, for Dunkirk was still forbidden) are as follows: 1705 = 402; 1706 = 691; 1707 = 747; 1708 = 729; 1709 = 512; 1710 = 303; 1711 = 108. It still needs to be said that trading with the enemy did not depend solely on Dutch policy; no French passports were accorded during the year before the 'interdiction' of 1 June 1703, nor immediately after its lifting on 1 June 1704, and they were revoked by *Ordonnance* of 19 Nov. 1710, nominally to revive the *course* (AN, F¹² 55, fo. 182). On the passport system at Bordeaux see Huetz de Lemps, *Géographie*, 67-93.

37. AD Gironde, 6B 81 to 85 ('registre des passeports'):

	1704	1705	1706	1707	1708	1709	1710
Northern Holland and Zuider Zee	—	71	108	199	299	103	65
Southern Holland	11	141	162	193	124	83	78
'Holland'	—	36	179	11	3	4	—
Zeeland	—	70	54	86	77	50	29

The *Conseil de Commerce* rejected the rumour that some of these ships gave information to the capers (AN, F¹¹ 51, fo. 85v.).

38. Bang and Korst, *Tablelier*, I, 30 ff. The *Conseil de Commerce* liked a degree of competition, but the neutrals were given special favours such as the remission of tonnage duty. On 28 July 1705 it was ruled that the Danes might come in vessels bought from the enemy after the outbreak of war: Citoyen Lebeau, *Nouveau code des prises* ... (3 vols. Paris, an VH) I, 290-291.

was room for the Scandinavians - until the great debacle of 1710. Significantly, however, the fact that they were coming in 1710 in mere dribbles was used as an argument for revoking the passports of the Dutch, who would now be unable to fall back on a Scandinavian disguise and so find themselves that much more in a hurry to make peace³⁹. Earlier French rules concerning the neutrals showed full awareness of wolves in sheep's clothes⁴⁰.

One wolf was Hamburg, whose role almost throughout these wars was formally that of a belligerent, doing its best to be treated as a sheep. Its local politics could be stormy. The Senate, always under strong pressure from the burghers and reluctant to publish the Imperial *avocatoria* prohibiting trade with the enemy, twice dragged its feet for over a year after the Empire had gone to war - and made little effort to enforce the *avocatoria* when they had been published. Hamburgers were trading with hostile Spain and pressing for French passports even before the Emperor followed the States General in lifting the Allies' Interdiction of 1703-1704⁴¹. But this time, unlike 1689-1697, the French were slow to co-operate: it was said that the Hamburgers would mask Dutch ships, or bring Baltic produce of high value which was not allowed to the Dutch. Their merchant fleet in 1706 was estimated at 400 vessels - twice as many as Bremen and Lübeck combined⁴². When permission was eventually given to Hamburg in 1706, it was for light ships only, to come in ballast and subject to securities which the Hamburgers, suggestively, had tried to avoid. With the renewed embargo on the Dutch some of these restrictions were relaxed by 1711, when the three Hansa cities between them loaded 32 ships at Bordeaux, rising to 77 in 1712⁴³. However, the indications are that a great deal of

39. AN, F¹² 55, fo. 185: this was a heavy price for the French to pay - the whole prosperity of a wide area between Loire and Gironde, and its fiscal resilience.

40. 'Règlements' of 17 Feb. 1694 and 23 July 1704: *Lebeau, Nouveau Code*, I, 188-189, 283-289; concerning the Danes in particular, *ibidem*, 281-282, 290-291.

41. Britain gave approval on 23 November 1705, but did not mention Spain, with which she was now resuming trade herself: PRO, SP 82/21, fos. 30, 158, 208; SP 82/22, fo. 22 (Wich to Harley, 17 July, 30 Sept., 14 Dec. 1705, 6 March 1706). AN, F¹² 51, fos. 235v. (23 Jan. 1704), 333 (10 June 1705), and Marine B⁷ 230 (Nov. 1703).

42. AN, F¹² 51, fos. 351, 396v., 416: the figures are those of Abbé Bidal, the French envoy who stayed on at Hamburg throughout this war, although in 1691 he had had to leave, much to the displeasure of Louis XIV.

43. *Ibidem*, fos. 420, 425-426 (14 and 21 July 1706); cf. Marine B7 225 (Bidal to Pontchartrain, 30 June, 3 July, 1702). Departures from Bordeaux under Hanseatic flags are recorded in AD Gironde, 6B 82 to 86 as follows:

	1706	1707	1708	1709	1710	1711	1712
Hamburg	1	10	15	9	7	17	41
Lübeck	—	2	—	1	—	9	19
Bremen	—	4	5	2	1	6	17
	1	16	20	12	8	32	77

The 1711-1712 figures would have been higher had the Hanseatics been allowed to buy Dutch ships and employ Dutch crews.

the earlier Danish-Swedish commerce with France (and at times Spain) was on Hanseatic account, an outstanding example being the predominantly Hamburger interest in the Swedish convoy arrested by Rooke in July 1697⁴⁴. To understand this we need only remember the Swedish and Danish territories on the lower reaches of Elbe and Weser, particularly the little towns of Altona, Glückstadt and Stade on the difficult estuary of the Elbe, where it was often necessary to unload cargoes into lighters for transport up to Hamburg. Swedish passports were readily available from the royal representatives at Stade (and for that matter in Swedish Pomerania). At Danish Glückstadt and Altona, described in 1691 as owning a mere half dozen ships of their own, it was said that over two hundred borrowed their flag⁴⁵.

Any connection with these places, or with Stade, created a *prima facie* suspicion in the prize courts; indeed, for the belligerents, it was entirely a diplomatic question whether all Danish and Swedish possessions in the Empire should not be treated as falling within its jurisdiction, and therefore subject to the *avocatoria* as the captors of prizes argued⁴⁶. In this as in other ways, French policy usually showed more consideration for the Swedes. An *ordonnance* of 23 January 1704 ruled that all Denmark's dependencies in Germany (but not Sweden's) were to forfeit their neutrality⁴⁷. Sweden's cliënt, the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, who by 1704 was paying off his grievance against the Maritime Powers by aiding French capers at Heligoland⁴⁸, was sometimes treated as a 'prince neutre', sometimes not, his position being further complicated by his possessions in Slesvig, which included the key ports of Husum and Tonnang (Tonningen) and lay outside the *avocatoria*, whereas Holstein itself did not; as if to make doubly sure of its safety, a Tonnang vessel might arm itself with papers from the innocent duchy of Slesvig. But even that was no sure protection, as the number of Slesvig vessels belonging to Flens-

44. Clark, *Dutch Alliance*, 114; cf. Bodleian Library, MS. Rawl. B 383, fo. 534, and Johnsen, *Imberetninger*, 75, 230.

45. Martangis, French ambassador at Copenhagen, 12 June 1691: Johnsen, *Imberetninger*, 34. Cf. *ibidem*, 77 for the belief at Versailles that Altona, 'presque un faubourg d'Hambourg, fait à présent tout le commerce de cette ville': the writer (6 April 1693) was almost certainly Pontchartrain, of all French ministers the one who had most to do with prizes. In a report of 4 Jan. 1692/1693 on 15 arrested 'Danes', Hedges notes 9 of Altona and Glückstadt. Of 7 ships which were the subject of the Swedish envoy's complaint to the States General in 1696, 4 came from Stade: ARA, Admiraliteitsarchieven 2519, 18 Jan. 1696. The dispatches of Sir Paul Rycout (British Library, Reference Division, Add. MSS. 19515 and 37663 and Lansdowne 1153 C and D) are illuminating on the abuse of Danish passports by Hamburgers 1689-1693.

46. AN, Marine C4 262, fos. 146-147, and 267, fos. 298v.-300v.: cases of 'Le Cavalier de Riga' (1696) and 'Le Bien Arrivé' (1704).

47. Lebeau, *Nouveau code*, I, 283-284; AN, F¹² 54, fo. 123. But the French had deprived Stade of its neutrality in 1694-1697.

48. PRO, SP 82/21, fos. 28, 208 (Wich to Harley, 13 May 1704, 14 Dec. 1705).

burg, Sonderborg and Apenrade in the prize records of London and Middelburg attest⁴⁹.

In Slesvig they doubted whether the English lawyers fully grasped the soleran meaning of the river Eider⁵⁰, and one can understand that even a well-meaning caper might fall into confusion about the legal status of any point on these coasts at any particular time. However, they very well knew that the whole area was under the economic dominion of Hamburg, which indeed handled a large part of England's exports to Denmark⁵¹, besides the general commission business it performed for British exporters, particularly after 1689, when the Merchant Adventurers lost their monopoly, with its Hamburg staple. The *Conseil des Prises* naturally gave short shrift to such a case as the 'Galère de Tonnangue', whose owner was described as a citizen of Tonnang but an 'homme de négoce' of Hamburg; though he had indeed assumed the citizenship of Hamburg to assist restoration of the galley when it was in English hands, he now maintained that he had had the whole Hamburg cargo transported to Tonnang for shipment⁵². Holstein ships, like so many others, might fetch coal and salt from Newcastle, or export pipestaves to Cadiz, but whale products had more obviously to do with the Hamburg fishery, discouraged as this became from French attacks⁵³. Like the Elbe navigation, Danish or Swedish, the seagoing vessels of Slesvig-Holstein were frequently manned by Hamburgers, whether or not they owned the ships: and a Hamburg shipmaster would naturally suggest a Hamburg owner⁵⁴.

The same applies to the many neutral ships which carried a Dutch master, usually one who had taken out *burgersbrieven* at some Baltic port. Of course, we must

49. For Zeeland see ARA, Admiraliteitsarchieven 5654, 17 Oct. 1703, 'Lijste van de Pretense Deensse en andere Neutrale Schepen' sent by J. Nachtegaal to St. Gen.; for Husum, cf. *ibidem* 2524, 6 June 1703, etc. 'De Hope van Apenrade' was there till 1707.

50. PRO, SP 82/21, fos. 41 (John Scarlett, Husum, 26 June 1704) and 162 (Wich to Harley, 28 July 1705).

51. *Ibidem* 103/4, Memorial concerning Trade between Denmark and Hamburg, 1702.

52. AN, Marine C4 269, fos. 248-249 (17 Oct. 1706).

53. E.g., cargo of 'Anna Katharina' of Husum, F. Petersen: PRO, H(igh) C(ourt of) A(dmiralty) 32/48. Although the cruises of Duguay-Trouin to the Arctic in 1702-1703 were only moderately successful, the destruction of the enemy's whale fishery remained a fixed objective at Versailles. Dutch sailings to Greenland slumped from 208 in 1703 to 130 in 1704 and an average of 125 from 1705 to 1714, according to the figures in Gerret van Santé, *Alphabetische Naam-Lyst van alle de Groenlandsche en Straat-Davissche Commandeurs ...* (Haarlem, 1770); cf. Van der Woude, *Het Noorderkwartier*, II, 427. Wich at Hamburg, 13 June 1704, refers to 'the loss of the Greenland fishery', for which the Hamburgers bought 30 Danish passports in 1694: PRO, SP 82/21. fo. 36; cf. L. Brinner, *Die Deutsche Grönlandfahrt* (Berlin, 1913) 228-230.

54. French prosecutors made much of this: e.g., among the confiscations, cases of 'L'Espérance' of Glückstadt and 'La Marguerite' of Altona in AN, Marine C⁴ 257, fos. 234v.-235, and 259, fo. 89v.; cf. *ibidem* 261, fo. 82, 'St. Pierre' of Lübeck, whose master obtained Stade citizenship. Examples of abuse of Slesvig and Holstein papers in *ibidem* 266, fos. 27v.-28v., 'Fortune de Toningue', and 267, fos. 173v.-174, 'Armes d'Husum'.

allow for some who lived there before the wars, like so many of the Scottish⁵⁵, but the majority were recent arrivals, even if they did not always take their wives with them⁵⁶; they would have understood Karl Pietersen, of Ameland, who confessed that he lived at Stade, as shipmaster and owner, 'seulement pour naviguer avec plus de sécurité'⁵⁷. The formalities were so simple that an Irishman, who was established master of a Swedish vessel at Amsterdam, received there not only a royal passport and flag but the freedom of Stockholm⁵⁸; and indeed there are instances of Dutch masters taking control of a neutral vessel at Amsterdam itself, including one who had taken oath before the ambassador at The Hague in 1680 to acquire Stockholm citizenship but not been there since⁵⁹. J. J. Kuiper, master of the 'Juffrouw Anna' of Karlskrona - Dutch-built like so many other neutral vessels - had the honesty to depose that 'il demeure où il se trouve', but that his owner's father lived in Amsterdam⁶⁰.

While there can be no doubt that war stimulated a certain migration of owners and masters from belligerent to neutral countries, thus adding to the Nordic melting-pot, it is clear that neutrals found it hard to obey the direct-voyage rule imposed by the belligerents. In peace, when ships were free to pick up cargoes according to circumstances, their capacity was already under-utilized⁶¹. War accentuated some of the causes - slow turnround and voyages in ballast - while introducing rigidities of its own. Thus a French destination was no protection against French corsairs for neutrals which called at enemy ports *en route* for, say, Bourgneuf or Bordeaux. But since Britain and the Republic on the whole absorbed far more Baltic commodities than the French wanted, a call at Newcastle or Amsterdam, Rotterdam or London, whence cargo or ballast to Bourgneuf or Bordeaux, was better economics than a single voyage outward in light cargo or ballast. So the direct-voyage rule to or from France, though it was prescribed by the Convention of the Maritime Powers with Denmark as well as by French law, was

55. E.g., Alexander Gill at Stockholm (*ibidem* 264, fo. 82, 'Etoile du Jour'); Alexander Moncrieff at Danzig (*ibidem* 266, fo. 105, 'Pelican Doré').

56. E.g., the masters of 'St. Pierre' and 'Fortune', both of Stockholm (*ibidem* 257, fo. 157, and 275, fos 43-44), and Willem Tuissen, at Stade (*ibidem* 266, fo. 108v.-109, 'Dauphin'); Bowe Janssen, at Danzig, had left two children in the Vlie (*ibidem* 275, fo. 84, 'St. Pierre'); cf. the master of 'Les Armes de Stettin', who was born in Edinburgh and lived at Emden (*ibidem* 267, fo. 172). On the general practice in Sweden, see the case of 'Neptune' of Carlshaven (Karlshamn), Claes Backer, PRO, HCA 32/47.

57. *Ibidem* 261, fo. 18v., 'St. Pierre'.

58. *Ibidem* 259, 14v.-15v., 'Faucon Jaune', Jacob Galt.

59. *Ibidem* 261, fos. 112-113, 'Comte de Vrede', Claessen; cf. *ibidem*, fos. 70-71, 'Dauphin Blanc', 135-137, 'Demi-Lune', and 262, fo. 142, 'Fortune Dorée' of Danzig. Tuissen (*supra*, n. 56) took over at Rotterdam.

60. *Ibidem* 264, fo. 66, 'Demoiselle Anne'.

61. See R. Davis, 'Merchant Shipping in the Economy of the Late Seventeenth Century', *Economic History Review*, 2nd ser. IX (1956-1957) 59-73.

frequently flouted⁶²; many were the neutrals caught straying from the course implied in their bills of lading, with or without the weather conniving⁶³. Crews, indeed, were sometimes hired at Dutch ports of call. However, if Scandinavian sails were frequently worked by Dutch seamen, one might equally call attention to the number of Scandinavians in Allied service, despite the militia obligations which kept many of them from emigrating: in 1691 it was claimed that the Maritime Powers employed 8,000 Danes and Norwegians, though this was a French guess⁶⁴. A kind of *lingua franca* of the North Sea could make it difficult to distinguish them from the Dutch seamen.

It is astonishing how many neutral skippers were unable to produce in court a bill of sale for their foreign-built ships, unless it were a defective one - for instance, with no price stated. It could happen that the buyer's indenture had been mysteriously left with the Dutch seller, which would delay trial, although I have come across only one case of a master, a Holsteiner, lamely agreeing 'qu'il ne connoist pas particulièrement les propriétaires de son vaisseau'⁶⁵. Nevertheless, the prize courts often released a ship when they condemned the cargo. So far as this is not evidence of diplomatic courtesy - what the Zeelanders called 'politique Resolutiën' - it implies genuine changes of ownership. Cargoes, of course, were an entirely different matter. While charterparties were exceptional, bills of lading often covered goods freighted on enemy account, occasionally being sent even overland⁶⁶. During the years of prohibition, the prize court at London confiscated friendly as well as enemy cargoes on board the neutrals, while usually restoring the ship itself⁶⁷. The

62. E.g., PRO, HCA 32/65, 'St. John', Blom, and 'Juffrouw Regina', Giese, both of Stockholm; *ibidem* 64, 'Juffrouw Catharina' of Flensburg, whose master received his pass by post to Amsterdam; *ibidem* 86 (1), 'White Bear' of Stockholm, whose master received orders at Elsinore to accept cargo at Amsterdam before going on to Bordeaux, where he was laded by Philip Vandenbranden, a 'Flanderkin'; and *ibidem* 77 for the case of T. Hielman, master of the 'Patience' of Karlshamn, bound for Bordeaux, who received orders at Amsterdam to exchange his Karlshamn pass for one sent by his owners to Amsterdam. Cf. Huetz de Lemp, *Géographie*, 70. I have come across a number of such cases for 1696 in AD Gironde 6B 123 ('Lettres de mer').

63. E.g., AN, Marine C4 259, fo. 104, 'Comtesse de Samsøe'; 261, fos. 47v.-48v., 'Amitié'; 262, 84v.-85, 'Cheval Marin Doré'.

64. Johnsen, *Innberetninger*, 64, 73.

65. AN, Marine C⁴ 262, fo. 170, 'St. Nicolas'; *ibidem* fo. 145v., 'Liberté de Stade'; *ibidem* 269, fo. 209v., 'Pigeon Bleu'.

66. E.g., *ibidem* C4 255, fo. 192, 'Roy de Danemarck'; PRO, HCA 32/54, 'Copperberg', Mandahl; *ibidem* 77, 'St. Peter' of Arendal. The 'Koperberg' had been freed by the States General on 21 June 1704: ARA, Admiraliteitsarchieven 5655, 18 June.

67. E.g., PRO, HCA 77, 'Princess Hedwig Sophia', 'Pellican', 'Patientia', and 'Patriarch Abraham', all of Stockholm; 85, 'Vreede' of Flensburg. The last four were laden in 1704 at Bordeaux by Hendrick Lutkens, alternately described as a Hamburger and a Dutchman; the 'Vreede' also by a Hollander, D. Devisch (wines, brandies, plums, molasses), for Hamburg or Emden. Although the 'Pellican's' cargo was for carriage to Hamburg, the mate, a Hamburger, explained in court that delivery would not necessarily be taken there; the master of the 'Patriarch' (who lived at Stettin)

court at Middelburg added to its sins by doing the same⁶⁸. Some cargoes to France had a British taint, but these were usually found in *bona fide* (though under British law illicit) Irish bottoms for which the French, needing salted beef and pork for the Antilles (and with Irish Jacobites well established as business houses at Nantes and elsewhere), poured out passports⁶⁹. England herself at this time was more interested in her Iberian trade, sometimes covered by false Spanish papers.

These subterfuges, generically known to contemporaries as *lorrendraijerij* (*anglice* 'lorendravery') and based on the closely knit trading communities of the northern seas, at a time when mercantilist economics and economic warfare were driving artificial political wedges into them, present an awkward commentary on the trade statistics of the day. For instance, is it certain that Dutch commerce with the Baltic, or the numbers of Dutch skippers passing that way⁷⁰, as distinct from Dutch shipping paying toll at the Sound, contracted so much during the 1690s? The tolls paid by English ships would be a poor indication of the nation's unprecedented demand for iron, masts and naval stores, even allowing for the development of its Archangel trade after 1699, when the Muscovy Company lost its monopoly. That Dutch traffic to Archangel then multiplied still further is indeed a pointer to a shortfall of tar, hemp and potash from Baltic sources⁷¹: and yet it was in 1708 that the Dunkirkers, highly expert in the scrutiny of ships' papers, could claim that the

claimed that his orders were for delivery at Emden 'if he came into the North Sea there by contrary winds, but better still for Stockholm'. The 'Uhlostadt' of Stockholm cleared thither at Bordeaux, and later escaped confiscation at Brest on the strength of it, but her true bills were for Emden: *ibidem* 85. The *Conseil de Commerce* thought that half the Dutch passports (which it authorized itself) were on French account: AN, F¹² 54, fo. 158,23 March 1708.

68. See the 'Lijste van de Pretense Deensse etc.' in ARA, Admiraliteitsarchieven 5654, 17 Oct. 1703: 'Juffrouw Margarita', 'Vijf Gebroeders', 'Concordia'. The captors allege that the first and last were disguised for Sonderborg by Arnoldus van Leeuwen, a substantial Dordrecht merchant who had obtained the citizenship of Sonderborg (after failing at Flensburg); the 'Hope', Christensen, a Holsteiner sailing from Harlingen, was accused of trading from Bordeaux to Hamburg; cf. the 'Landgrave von Hesse Cassel', Bilbao to Hamburg (*ibidem*).

69. *Ibidem*, 'Prophete Daniël' (Bordeaux to Dublin) and 'Henry and Mary' (Viana to Limerick, allegedly on French account). Cf. PRO, HCA 32/77, 'Prince Frederick', with an English supercargo who owned half the lading from Bordeaux to Copenhagen. Passports were accorded to Irish vessels from Bordeaux alone, 1704-1712, at an average rate of 41 a year, rising from 26 in 1704 to 75 in 1712. In the same period Scottish passes totalled 101: most of them were issued in 1704-1707, between the passage of the Edinburgh parliament's Wine Act and that of the Union. In 1702-1703 and 1703-1704 numbers involved were only 7 Irish and 6 Scots (Huetz de Lemps, *Géographie*, 62). The Scots were of course well placed to make use of the constant passage of Norwegian ships to France. France was short of lead, produced in the Lanarkshire hills (Smout, *Scottish Trade*, 8, 10, 225), and in 1706, when the Union looked likely, the Rouen Jacobite Arbuthnot proposed passes for 20 Scots ships a year to bring it (AN, F¹² 51, fos. 422v.-423).

70. Cf. Van der Woude, *Het Noorderkwartier*, 377, 388.

71. See J. M. Price in *New Cambridge Modern History*, VI, 841-844. Amsterdam alone increased its importation of Archangel tar from 18,000 tons in 1698 to 60,000 tons in 1713.

Swedes alone were carrying half the enemy's trade⁷². If we add the 'pretense Deense', such an estimate may not be too fanciful. But the risks of 'lorendrayery' contributed, along with higher wartime wages and insurance rates, to the cost of freights, normally borne by belligerent merchants. I would suggest that its techniques, as well as its costs, helped to thin out the number of these in some trades, not necessarily involving contraband or naval contracts. There indeed, in the dealings of the English Navy Board with its Baltic suppliers, 'the tritons swallowed the minnows completely'⁷³. But elsewhere, in the prize courts, a few names recur in connection with fraud and collusion: Peter Abestee of Copenhagen, J. P. Heublein of Stockholm, C. J. Mohrsen of Bergen, Andrew Vanderhagen at Amsterdam, Abraham Vanderhagen of Zierikzee, Peter van Arken of Ostend, Derijck Robijn of Dunkirk, Stephen Creagh at London, Daniel Denis at Bordeaux - besides those whom we have met already. The list could with some trouble - for the prize documents make miscellaneous and difficult reading - be lengthened and include members of the consular establishments. There are signs, too, that shipbrokers (*courtiers*) played a part in the supply of *ad hoc* documents to the practitioners of free trade, like that John Danielson of Middelburg who 'procured' Jacob Hies from Ostend to be a burgher and next day produced his *burgersbrief*, Middelburg pass and States pass, for a trip to Bourgneuf⁷⁴. In Dunkirk at least, some brokers promoted privateering armaments⁷⁵. Their wartime role would be worth closer investigation.

The '*lorrendraijerij* comme on l'appelle'⁷⁶ was not only practised on 'runners', sailing without convoy, for convoys were highly vulnerable too. Besides the disadvantages of convoys when they came to market, even one of thirty sail (let alone one of three or four hundred) would have its stragglers. The Dunkirk capers, in particular, were trained to insinuate themselves like pickpockets in a crowd, especially as they learned to join forces in a manner to which most privateers were recalcitrant; quite often, too, they attached themselves to the naval squadrons

72. AN, F¹² 54, fo. 123. Admittedly they had an axe to grind: the *Conseil des Prises*, which took decisions by majority vote, was showing undue tenderness to Swedes. On the other hand, Bon-repaus, in his 'Relation', fo. 30, had found the *Conseil* too inflexible in sentencing Danes.

73. John Ehrman, *The Navy in the War of William III 1689-1697* (Cambridge, 1953) 60.

74. For Van Arken, PRO, HCA 32/92 (1), 'Hope de Middleborough'. Cf. J. Olsenkemp, master of the 'Charles de Stromstatt', who shortly before leaving Amsterdam handed his passport 'suivant l'usage ordinaire ... au nommé Comelle Dolt, courtier de tous les Maltres des Vaisseaux de Nations Etrangères', and later received a different one, 'qu'il a pris sans y faire réflexion': AN, Marine C4 269, fo. 204.

75. F. Morel and P. Struve are so described in the *rôles de capitation* for 1708: Dunkirk, Archives Municipales, série 236. In the same year the intendant refers to N. Thibergé as 'courtier jure et aubergiste': AN, Marine B³ 155, fo. 151.

76. ARA, Admiraliteitsarchieven 2524, 11 Aug. 1703.

which got out of Dunkirk every year (though sometimes late) until 1710, well primed with information⁷⁷. It is true that, even more rapidly than the diplomatic couriers brought news of enemy movements to Versailles and the French ports, advices reached London and the Dutch admiralties from Flanders or Dunkirk itself that Jean Bart, or St. Pol or Forbin, was at sea; messages flew to the outposts and put the whole North Sea on the alert, keeping convoys in harbour or causing them to alter course⁷⁸. But given a few hours' start, on a spring tide by night, the French cruisers could elude the Allied blockading squadrons, whose ships were dirtier, slower and not well provisioned for a long chase. How baffling this was is best gathered from the 'proceedings' of these squadrons - by no means uniformly a failure as an annual summer blockade, though they did subtract twenty or thirty men-of-war from the Confederate fleet - as narrated by Josiah Burchett, who as secretary of the Admiralty had the task of adapting English naval dispositions to the forays of Bart and his successors⁷⁹. What happened when the convoys had to defend themselves, often heroically, was conscientiously recorded by Jhr. De Jonge⁸⁰, but many lesser episodes were reported to the *amirauté* at Dunkirk⁸¹. In spite of sensational losses, which wrung angry letters from the king-stadholder to Heinsius besides bringing deputations to The Hague from Amsterdam and arousing storms in the Westminster parliament, notably in 1693, we can see how well the convoys on the whole performed their duty⁸²; there was no parallel in the North Sea to the case of the 'Smyrna convoy' in 1693, unless it was Forbin's razzia towards Archangel in 1707, but this was more spectacular than profitable⁸³. At

77. For movements at the Sound, Marstrand and Flekkør, see Johnsen, *Innberetninger*, *passim*; cf. Henri Malo, *Les corsaires dunkerquois et Jean Bart* (2 vols, Paris, 1913-1914) II, 175, 215, 226-227. Thus the French embassy at Copenhagen obtained advance notice of Dutch sailings through Danish sources at The Hague, or from Danzig: Johnsen, *Innberetninger*, 46, 85. On 23 July 1697 Bonrepaus reported the arrival of 400 sail at Elsinore under two Dutch escorts, which turned for home two days later with 50: *ibidem*, 239. Cf. J. C. de Jonge, *Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche zeewezen* (5 vols, Zwolle, 1869) III, 495.

78. A notable example was Bart's summer campaign in 1696: Malo, *Jean Bart*, II, 312-313. Cf. Josiah Burchett, *A Complete History of the most Remarkable Transactions at Sea* (London, 1720) 549-551, 636-640, 660-661.

79. On the difficulties of obtaining prompt Dutch co-operation, *ibidem*, 437, 440, 550, 637.

80. De Jonge, *Nederlandsche zeewezen*, III, 264, 337-340, 407-417, 499-506, 714-715; IV, 31-32, 78-83.

81. There is a series of these 'déclarations de capitaines', with gaps for certain years, in AN, Marine C⁴, 252, 258, 263, 268, 272-273, 276; the 'déclarations' for 1710-1711 are now in the naval archives at Cherbourg.

82. Ranke, *History of England*, VI, 289, 291; De Jonge, *Nederlandsche zeewezen*, III, 377-379, 414, 507; F. A. Johnston, 'Parliament and the Protection of Trade 1689-1694', *The Mariner's Mirror*, LVII (1971) 399-413.

83. See H. Malo, *La grande guerre des corsaires: Dunkerque 1702-1715* (Paris, 1925) 71-73, 82; cf. *Mémoires du comte de Forbin* (2 vols., Amsterdam, 1748) 239-252. For the loss of a large part of the Anglo-Dutch convoy to Smyrna, etc. in 1693, see De Jonge, *Nederlandsche zeewezen*, III, 349-362.

least during the Nine Years War the joint Danish-Swedish convoys had more to fear, and in 1703-1705 as much from privateers perhaps as from the Confederate navies.

The periodical uproar in the English parliament, while it was fed by stories of poor convoy discipline and graft, owed more to miscarriages at sea in general, of which, shocking as they were, hugely innated figures were bandied about. Hence cruisers were as important as convoys. As the Admiralty Lords put it,

the Trade cannot be secured by Convoys and Cruizers only, but by a sufficient number of Shippes to be employed both as Convoys and Cruizers, and not to be taken therefrom by any other service⁸⁴.

By tacking three clauses to a money bill in 1694, the Commons succeeded in setting aside 43 ships, over and above 'convoys to remote parts', for trade protection: they did the same in more explicit form in 1708, prescribing no less than nine cruisers for the northeast coast of Great Britain alone, which shows some tenderness for Scottish resentments of long standing⁸⁵. One may compare this proportion of nearly one half of the total British 3rd to 6th rate ships in commission in February 1708 with the numbers allocated to trade protection by the Dutch navy in 1696, when it was still powerful: rather more than a third of the comparable rates - 35 out of 93. If we include 'convoys to remote parts' the English allocation is higher still⁸⁶. After 1702, of course, the defensive emphasis in Dutch policy became stronger, on sea as well as land, revenues and the naval establishment finally contracting together until in 1710 there was scope only for the force in the Mediterranean and the squadron that sailed out every year to meet the returning East-India fleet near the Orkneys, with results only too clearly written in the French prize judgements⁸⁷.

When we look closely at the employment of English cruisers and convoys, nevertheless, we notice how over-stretched they were. A convenient official account for 1694 shows that less than half the cruisers were engaged in North Sea work. Of these, most were concentrated off the Dutch coasts - between Zeeland and Dover early in the year, then in the Broad Fourteens between Texel and Maas - with a

84. Bodleian Library, MSS. Rawl. A 450, fo. 30, copy of letter from Admiralty to Secretary Trenchard, 11 Sept. o.s. 1693.

85. 5 and 6 Will. and Mary, c1, ss. lxxix-lxxxii; 6 Ann., c. 65. Cf. Johnston, 'Parliament', and Smout, *Scottish Trade*, 67.

86. De Jonge, *Nederlandsche zeewezen*, III, 746-749: as measured by gunpower, the proportion was just over a quarter. Cf. the lists in J. H. Owen, *War at Sea under Queen Anne* (Cambridge, 1938) app. B.

87. The whale-fishery traditionally looked after itself, but in 1703 four escorts were reported to Duguay-Trouin at Jan Mayen island: Le Nepvou de Carfort, *Histoire de Du Guay Trouin* (Paris, 1922) 224; cf. A. Bijl Mz., *De Nederlandse Convooidienst 1300-1800* (The Hague, 1951) 92-95.

view to intercepting French cornships; only a dozen were plying, intermittently, between Tynemouth and the Downs, several of these being detached to guard the mackerel and herring fisheries off Yarmouth and the North Foreland in summer and autumn⁸⁸. On the other hand, the majority of English short-haul convoys are to be found in the North Sea: up and down the east coast itself, in 1694 (but not always) as far as the Forth, and shepherding the crowded traffic (not forgetting His Majesty's person - eight warships for each crossing) to Holland, Hamburg, Elsinore and Gothenburg - from the Forth, Tyne, Humber, Yarmouth roads, and Thames; the recently established packets between Harwich and Den Briel sailed without convoy (and sometimes fell into enemy hands)⁸⁹. Various combinations were possible - thus the relatively strong Gothenburg convoy could see the Hamburg trade within fifty miles of Heligoland - and to these we have to add the reciprocal services provided by the United Provinces to Leith, Hull and so on, besides the Dutch fishery guardships moving between Orkney and the Dogger Bank, or off Yarmouth, according to season. It all begins to resemble a map of the London Underground until we recollect the caprices of the winds, the unpredictable timetables, the scarcity of escorts (and in England of crews to man them)⁹⁰, the many places struggling to keep their transport moving without benefit of convoy - so numerous as to make one ask whether the whole system may not have worked to the advantage of the greater terminals and junctions.

To perceive something of the political repercussions of wartime losses, we need some idea of who the losers were. Here, since I face an audience which may not be familiar with the coaling staithes of Northumberland or the drowned valleys of Suffolk, I may claim a privilege like that historian of the English Channel who announced: 'The scope of this book is the English shore of the Channel'⁹¹. At this

88. *House of Lords Manuscripts*, new ser.I, (1693-1695) (London, 1903; reprinted 1965) 474-483. Half a dozen were 'off Dunkirk' where the blockading squadron fluctuated in strength, the Dutch usually watching the east channel and the English the west. On the fiasco of the September bombardment and the smoke-machines invented by Mr. Meesters, see Burchett, *Complete History*, 502-504, 527-529; there was a second attempt in August 1695. Cf. Malo, *Jean Bart*, II, 267-292.

89. See J. R. Bruijn, 'Postvervoer en Reizigersverkeer tussen de Lage Landen en Engeland ca. 1650-ca. 1870', in P. W. Klein and J. R. Bruijn, ed., *Honderd Jaar Engelandvaart* (Bussum, 1975) esp. 33-37. There are details in Kenneth Ellis, *The Post Office in the Eighteenth Century* (London, 1958), who notes the increased volume of official correspondence in wartime; cf. a charming evocation in Charles Wilson, *Holland and Britain* (London, s.a.) 35-38. In 1693 the French government offered a premium for their capture. Of several packets taken into Dunkirk in 1691-1693, at least one was the Dutch (Malo, *Jean Bart*, II, 207, 242 n., 248); during the next war, several appear in the Dunkirk prize *judgements* and in the captains' *déclarations*, but it is not certain which service they were operating - most probably the Dutch.

90. See (e.g.) *House of Lords MSS. 1693-1695*, 494; Ehrman, *The Navy*, 109-120; J. S. Bromley, *The Manning of the Royal Navy: Selected Public Pamphlets 1693-1873* (London, Navy Records Society, 1976 for 1974) xxv-xxix, 1-70.

91. James A. Williamson, *The English Channel: A History* (London, 1959) 13.

time England's coastal still exceeded her foreign-going tonnage and nearly three-quarters of it was on the east coast. It was easily dominated by the colliers - of Whitby, Scarborough, Lynn, Yarmouth, Ipswich, Rochester, etc. - shuttling between Tyne or Tees and the Thames, where coal prices could be politically sensitive. Besides fuel, London obtained much of its food by this route, thanks to a vigorous use of the rivers, especially those which collect into the Humber; thus Cheshire hams and cheeses came to London from Hull, though with more difficulty than Kentish or East Anglian grain⁹². Only the little ports of Kent, however, were now wholly subservient to the monstrous growth of the capital⁹³. Tyneside, while rivalled by Sunderland and Leith as a coal exporter, was an industrial centre producing salt, glass, bricks, iron or steel tools and heavy forgings, heavily reliant on Sweden; in 1686 nearly as many ships cleared from Newcastle to 'nearby' Europe as from London⁹⁴. Hull's industrial hinterland, too, between Ouse and Trent, gave it not only a coastal traffic in its own right but a growing volume of imports from Scandinavia and of exports to Holland⁹⁵. The Bounty Act of 1689 boosted its corn exports, and still more those of East Anglia, when harvests were good. Eastern and even western Scotland, despite a prolonged economic crisis in this period, maintained multiple links with Scandinavia, Hamburg, Bremen and Rotterdam (and Aberdeen with Veere); Scotland also had the unusual distinction during the wars of increasing its share of the herring market beyond the Sound⁹⁶. Most of Scotland's imports from England came in coasters, especially from London; but manufactured and entrepot goods also arrived from the United Provinces, which had a strong stake in Scottish shipowning, notably at Bo'ness⁹⁷.

Before noticing wartime losses it is pertinent to recollect that the characteristic vessels in these trades - the flyboats and pinks, the barques and brigantines, the ketches and hoys - were extremely numerous and of small tonnage: barely 80 tons

92. Davis, *Shipping Industry*, 33; T. S. Willan, *The Early History of the Don Navigation* (Manchester, 1965) 5. For the cargoes moving between London and the outports in 1683, see *idem*, *The English Coasting Trade 1600-1750* (Manchester, 1938) 204-207.

93. And Chatham dockyard, which explains the considerable imports of Baltic timber and naval stores at Rochester, besides much activity at Ramsgate. The Thames estuary between Rochester and Whitstable was famous in the Netherlands for its oysters. See D. W. Chalklin, *Seventeenth-Century Kent* (London, 1965) esp. 170-178.

94. Edward Hughes, *North Country Life in the Eighteenth Century* (London, 1952) 12-13, 61, 159; *idem*, *Studies in Administration and Finance 1558-1825* (Manchester, 1934) 406-408; T. S. Ashton, *Iron and Steel in the Industrial Revolution* (Manchester, 1924) 21, 55, 110; S. Middlebrook, *Newcastle upon Tyne: Its Growth and Achievement* (Newcastle, 1950) 88, 109; Davis, *Shipping Industry*, 211. Cf. Willan, *Coasting Trade*, 206.

95. Gordon Jackson, *Hull in the Eighteenth Century* (London, 1972) 7-10, 26-32, 51-54, 335-341.

96. Smout, *Scottish Trade*, 153-166, 185-194, 223. Some of Glasgow's trade to Holland went out into the Forth, where Bo'ness was the key point, but it already had direct contacts with Scandinavia; its vessels also carried Ulster produce (*ibidem*, 144-145).

97. *Ibidem*, 55-56. For trade with England and the Netherlands, *ibidem*, ch. ix.

on average in the clearances for Holland and Germany (London included) in 1715-1717, and about 30 tons for Flanders, although the average collier had an estimated capacity of 140 tons in 1702, when there were nearly 1,300 of them - perhaps a superfluity, though incidentally not confined to the transport of coal⁹⁸. This is the one clear case, apart from the slavers, in which the master and other shipowners, whoever they were⁹⁹, owned also the cargo between loading and delivery; but it is true in general that many merchants were shipowners, often freighting their own ships on their own account as well as chartering or freighting others. Master mariners were often merchants too, or on the way to becoming merchants. Many small vessels were entirely owned by them and so represented a sizeable part of their savings; buying a ship was a way of rising to be shipmaster. In parallel, a fresh fisherman's capital was locked up in his boat and gear.

The recent expansion of English tonnage generally had indeed imposed a huge strain on the nation's capital stock - Sir William Petty, the pioneer statistician, estimated it at no less than ten per cent, exclusive of real estate. Of course shipowners divided their risks, as freighters and insurers did, thus limiting their losses but making it the more likely that they would not escape some. The London insurance market was still immature: it could not cope with such a disaster as overtook the 'Smyrna convoy' in 1693, and later it was claimed that the failures of underwriters in these wars had run to £2,000,000¹⁰⁰. Above all, shipowning itself was still so unspecialized an occupation that a great many investors were at risk. They embraced hundreds of ancillary dealers and craftsmen, such as victualers, distillers, brewers, vintners, ironmongers, fishmongers, cheesemongers, bakers, salters, apothecaries, warehousekeepers, packers, corn-factors, oil-men, shipchandlers, shipwrights, ropemakers, sailmakers, gunmakers, compass-makers, coopers, joiners, painters, blacksmiths, turners, sword cutlers, upholsterers, glaziers, haberdashers and even barbers¹⁰¹. What is less obvious, English ship-

98. Davis, *Shipping Industry*, 209-211; T. S. Ashton and J. Sykes, *The Coal Industry of the Eighteenth Century* (Manchester, 1929) 199-200; cf. Willan, *Coasting Trade*, 16. Some colliers already exceeded 400 tons. Besides being switched to the Baltic trade, they are found in the prize records carrying coal, fish, bottles, etc. simultaneously: e.g., 'John and Marian' of Yarmouth (AN, G⁵ 253, 21 March 1712). On the question of a superfluity, see Hughes, *North Country Life*, 173, 203-204. Ashton and Sykes, 249, tabulate coal exports from the Tyne 1700-1710, showing troughs in 1702, 1706-1707, 1710 (when there were disturbances among keelmen and shipmasters).

99. Hughes, *North Country Life*, 162 ff., 201, shows that some parts in ships were held by mine-owners.

100. Davis, *Shipping Industry*, 127, and 'Merchant Shipping in the Economy of the Late Seventeenth Century', 71; C. Wright and C. E. Fayle, *A History of Lloyd's* (London, 1928) 42-51.

101. All prominently represented in PRO, HCA 25/14-20: letter of marque bonds, 1702-1708; giving security for the good behaviour of a privateering captain (or more commonly of an armed merchantman) these could, and as a rule probably did, imply an interest in the armament. At Dunkirk, the principal armateurs (*dépositaires*) are almost interchangeable with their 'cautions'. On English shipowning generally see Davis, *Shipping Industry*, ch. v.

owning extended far beyond the quaysides and counting houses, thanks to the exceptional protection afforded by the law to this type of partnership and to the ease of moving in or out of it¹⁰². If it is true that merchant groups were as a rule identified with particular trades, and also as either importers or exporters, evidence is now accumulating that landowners from Kent to Scotland shipped cargoes at their own risk and sometimes held parts of the ships as well; they too have their nimbus of corn-dealers, brewers, maltsters, and so on¹⁰³. Whatever the extent of these interests, so much agricultural produce was lifted coastwise, in any case, that even Members of Parliament for inland shires shared the alarms aroused by mis-carriages at sea¹⁰⁴.

Only by recognizing such facts as these - and their echoes in a noisy journalism - is it possible to understand British insistence, from 1706 onwards, in making the destruction of Dunkirk a *sine qua non* of a European peace settlement. Godolphin found it curious that the States General should have resisted this, even if only to use it as a bargaining point in the early Barrier negotiations: as he wrote to Buys, 'in this we cannot doubt of your concurrence, since that place is equally pernicious to the trade both of Holland and England'¹⁰⁵. There were grounds for that assumption in the series of *plakkaten* (1697-1704) awarding a differential premium for enemy warships captured or destroyed in the North Sea: even when the Zeelanders, on 28 July 1705, obtained equal rates beyond the Straits of Dover, as a trade-off for no longer molesting neutral shipping in any trade permitted to Dutch nationals, it was stipulated that privateers must first cruise for a fortnight between Shetland and Dover. While this compulsion is enough to remind us that the Zeelanders - in my view the most formidable privateers on any side in these wars (though fewer than thirty at sea on average for 1702-12) - preferred to operate outside the North Sea, the premiums awarded in 1703-1705 suggest that they found plenty to do here: a total of fl. 638,825 for 113 awards. Although the figure jumped to fl. 927,950 in 1707 and to fl. 706,700 in 1708, for 71 and 56 awards respectively - reflecting the fact that the Channel Soundings, Biscay, the Iberian coasts and the Mediterranean were more remunerative cruising-grounds - there are indications that captures of

102. *Ibidem*, 102-104.

103. D. W. Jones, 'London Merchants', 326; Chalklin, *Kent*, 171-172; Smout, *Scottish Trade*, 72-76. Dr. Smout has argued (*ibidem*, 272) that the increasing interest of the Scottish nobility in export trade was a major reason why they supported the Union.

104. Johnston, 'Parliament', 403.

105. According to Burchett, *Complete History*, 435, its destruction by bombardment was considered as early as 1691. From May 1706 Godolphin repeatedly urged Marlborough to attack it and on 14 June wrote to him that 'If wee can't gett Dunquerk by arms, wee must not now think of peace without a condition to demolish it and spoyle the harbour': Snyder, *Marlborough - Godolphin Correspondence*, 563, 570, 587. The demolition was proposed to Buys on 3 Sept. 1706 (*ibidem*, 666). Cf. J. G. Stork-Penning, *Het Grote Werk. Vredesonderhandelingen gedurende de Spaanse successie-oorlog 1705-1710* (Groningen, 1958) 272-275.

French corsairs in the North Sea increased again in 1710-1711¹⁰⁶. On the other hand, I have identified only 33 Zeeland privateers condemned to Dunkirk for the whole of the Spanish Succession War - rather more than ten per cent, say, of those commissioned¹⁰⁷.

Analysis of the sentences handed out by the *Conseil des Prises* during this war sheds further light on Godolphin's assumption. As against 340 British (including at least 38 Scottish) prizes, no less than 387 Dutch were brought into Dunkirk, while the number of Dutch vessels ransomed is nearly twice the British: 411 compared with 226 (including some 50 Scots). Furthermore, the value of the Dutch ransoms is three times the British: fl. 945,415 (say, £94,000) compared with £ 32,580 (Scottish £ 5,980). But this is not all, for on the enemy side the Dunkirkers did not have the North Sea to themselves. Contrary to my own earlier supposition, the small privateers of Calais, which were numerous, were at least as active in the North Sea as in the English Channel, and not merely in the Straits of Dover, where operations could be inhibited by the naval rendezvous in the Downs. If they took fewer Scottish prizes than did the Dunkirkers, they ransomed rather more: 68 against 50, to an approximate value of £ 6,250, and mostly after 1706. Within the North Sea alone their British ransoms as a whole numbered 371, over twice as many as their Dutch ransoms (171), although here the respective values were approximately equal: £ 33,900 and fl. 333,750 (say £ 33,000)¹⁰⁸. The

106. Figures collected from ARA, Admiraliteitsarchieven 2524-2526, 2438, 2528-2533; awards declined to 26 in 1710 but rose to 47 in 1711 (*ibidem* 2536-2537), although by these dates, if not already by 1707, the awards were in arrears, so that they become a less reliable index of year-to-year activity: see 'Some Zeeland Privateering Instructions: Jacob Sautijn to Captain Salomon Reynders' in Ragnild Hatton and J. S. Bromley, ed., *William III and Louis XIV* (Liverpool and Toronto, 1968) 172-173. *The plakkat*en of 31 May 1697, 6 June 1702, 28 July 1705 and the *ampliatie* (doubling in 1704 of premiums for the North Sea only), with various elucidations, will be found in C. Cau's *Groot Placaet-Boeck* (The Hague, 1658-1796) IV, 217-219, 1268-1269; V, 300-315.

107. AN, G³ 234-255, 'Dépouillement des jugements de prises juin 1702 à déc. 1713'. What follows is based on this source. A few of the prizes or ransoms declared at Dunkirk were the work of Calaisien corsairs; equally, the Dunkirkers occasionally declared their prizes at Calais. Both occasionally used Ostend (1702-1706) or Nieuwpoort, as well as Le Havre: these have been allocated to Dunkirk and Calais respectively. The Dunkirk figures also include a small number of prizes taken to Brest and Cadiz. The Calais figures refer only to actions known to have occurred in the North Sea; there were perhaps as many more in the English Channel.

108. The British figure is more likely to be an under-estimate since it excludes a number of cases where the place of capture remains undetermined. Ransom figures are occasionally expressed in *livres tournois*, which I have converted at 15 to £1 sterling; 12 and 16 lt were rates quoted in declarations to the Dunkirk *amirauté* on 5 Sept. 1696 and 18 Oct. 1707 (AN, Marine C⁴ 263 and 272). Dutch ransoms are usually given in florins, or 'argent de banque d'Hollande', occasionally as 'livres d'Hollande', which means florins too, not £vl. There are a few references to *écus* and to *louis d'or* (read as 4 and 20 *livres*). Most ransom figures include a small sum (usually £5 or 50 fl.) for the *capitaine preneur*. At Dunkirk this was known as *pluntrage*, representing a valuation of the captured captain's personal belongings and sometimes those of his officers and crew as well: see Arch. Mun. Dunkerque, 202, no. 9 (5 Aug. 1744). By *ordonnance* of 2 Dec. 1693 (Lebeau, *Nouveau*

number of British prizes taken into Calais (126) also exceeded the Dutch (86), apart altogether from what were taken in the Channel. When contemporaries referred, therefore, to the ravages of the Dunkirkers, they were including, whether they knew it or not, a substantial fraction of damage attributable to the men of Calais, and this relatively at British expense. The Calaisiens, moreover, willing to ransom for such tiny sums as £ 6 (a Scottish ferry boat), not infrequently got their ransoms paid on the spot or from the shore without troubling to take a hostage: so far as British coasts were concerned, they displayed a peculiar readiness to pry into bays and estuaries.

If we combine the depredations of Calais and Dunkirk, the crude totals of losses by British and Dutch are roughly equal: 466 and 473 prizes, 597 and 582 ransoms, respectively. Yet the average Dutch ransom (fl. 2,190 or £ 219) was twice the value of the British (£ 111). Can the same be said of the prizes? No firm conclusion can be drawn from the evidence available. The British losses to the Calais corsairs within the North Sea consisted very largely of colliers, cornships, and other coastal or fishing vessels; and Dunkirk's record would look less impressive if I had not included in it some prizes taken in the Channel (off Beachy Head or even in the Soundings), mainly from the Iberian, Mediterranean and overseas trades - the majority, it is true, bound to (less commonly from) London. However, we are comparing British and Dutch losses, not the performances of Calais and Dunkirk. So there is some significance in the fact that only a round forty Dutch ships were intercepted by the Dunkirkers when bound to or from southern Europe (mainly Lisbon), Guinea, Angola, Surinam and the West Indies, whereas British losses on these hauls, to the Dunkirkers alone, were half as many again¹⁰⁹. It is more surprising that the Dutch lost fewer than sixty vessels out of the fleets trading with Archangel, Norway and the Baltic, the British about thirty: a tribute to the convoy system.

As a rule, these last cargoes - worth less as a rule than those from southern Europe and considerably less than the tropical commodities - were a debit to northern Holland, especially Amsterdam, whose overall losses in 1702-1713 might be reckoned at less than eighty voyages, including a few ransoms¹¹⁰. Only a dozen

code, I,186-187) the maximum ransom was 10,000 *livres* and the minimum 1,000, refusal of which led to sinking: since we are dealing here primarily with losses, I have included such rare cases in the prize totals.

109. To Dunkirk only: Mediterranean, 6; Spain and Portugal, 27; Azores, Canaries, 6; Guinea, 2; West Indies, 14; other colonies, 9; East Indies, 2. Some of these were of course taken outside the North Sea, in one case off Cape Clear, while another 21 prizes were intercepted off the south coast of England.

110. In 1702 the 'Espérance' and the 'Jeune Estienne et André', bound from the Baltic to Amsterdam, were ransomed for 1,200 and 3,900 florins; the former was from Danzig in grain (AN, G⁵ 235, fo. 1); in 1709 a Scot bound to Danzig paid £250 (*ibidem* 248, 1 July). Given the rough manners of the captors and the fatigues of going hostage, it cannot be assumed that these vessels and cargoes were worth a lot more to their owners.

voyages were to or from Portugal and the Mediterranean, perhaps a couple from the West Indies, and one in ballast to the East; on these hauls Rotterdam and the Zeeland ports experienced more disappointments¹¹¹. Relatively, the outstanding victim was the versatile Zierikzee: forty ships taken prize - from Norway, Hamburg, Tyneside, Scotland, Ireland and Portugal - in timber, coal, lead, butter, fruit, wines, coffee, shrimps and salmon, not to mention oysters from Rochester and Falmouth and its own fishing vessels, mostly with cod. To this we must add thirty or forty Zierikzee ransoms, nearly all ex-fishery, at prices ranging between fl. 1,250 and fl. 2,400. It was, in fact, the herring and cod fisheries of Zierikzee and, above all, of the Maas ports that accounted for the bulk of all Dutch ransoms - Maassluis in particular, with fifty laden fishing vessels carried off to Dunkirk in addition (compared with nine of Vlaardingen)¹¹². The cost of this one war to the fisheries of the Maas towns alone might be conservatively computed at fl. 1,250,000. No great sum perhaps for Amsterdam to reckon with? So was it because the privateering war was felt most acutely on the Maas and in Zeeland that the great city apparently cared so little for the demolition of Dunkirk?

The hypothesis might be strengthened if we knew more, first, about the relative stake of southern Holland and Zeeland in the trade with the British Isles and, second, about that of northern Holland in the cargoes carried by neutral and Hanseatic shipping. Both Hamburg and Stade in this war suffered severely from the Dunkirkers, the Norwegians and Danes less so than in the previous war¹¹³. Was it only for diplomatic reasons that Zeeland's interference with all these did not endear that province to the Hollanders? As during the first half of the Nine Years War, foreign envoys (including the Imperial ambassador) had some sharp words for the alleged malpractices of Middelburg and Vlissingen during the earlier years of its

111. The total losses of Middelburg and Vlissingen, excluding privateers but including half a dozen slavers, were approximately 15 in each case, compared with Rotterdam's 23.

112. But Vlaardingen lost 10 to the Calaisiens, Maassluis 14 and Zierikzee 11. Delfshaven and Schiedam suffered lightly at the hands of French corsairs; nor was Dunkirk responsible for the decline of the herring fishery of Enkhuizen, noticed by Van de Woude, *Het noorderkwartier*, 403. By international convention, the fresh fishermen were left alone, so long as they carried no salt or barrels: see (e.g.) ARA, Admiraliteitsarchieven 2756, letters of 31 July 1702 and 12 March 1703 from Vergier at Dunkirk. But in this something depended on local agreements: thus in 1708 the Amsterdam admiralty is found proposing the same freedom for the Texel fishery as the Zeelanders enjoyed with Dunkirk (AN, F¹² 54, fos. 163v.-170). Breaches were sufficiently frequent to give rise to an Anglo-French treaty between the belligerents in May 1708, renewed in 1710, though complaints from both sides continued till the end of the war. No such treaty was made with the Dutch, because they wanted it to extend to their cod and herring fisheries.

113. 34 Hamburgers were taken to Dunkirk and two were ransomed; but there were also 21 prizes allegedly belonging to Stade and 29 Swedes. Cf. 19 Norwegians, 7 Danes (but only one of Glückstadt and none of Altona in this war), a dozen Holsteiners and 11 Danzigers. All five of the prizes flying the flag of Brandenburg were alleged to be on Dutch account, as was one bound to Etnden and several to Hamburg. Bremen lost seven vessels captured and three ransomed, mostly trading with London; one Lübecker was ransomed, as were two of Rostock.

successor; but the dozen privateers of Dover and the Cinque Ports, which thrived entirely by arresting Scandinavians and Hanseatics in the Straits, were more obnoxious still. In the years 1703-1705 (before the bottom dropped out of their business when the Dutch opened their licensed trade with France), with the help of the navy, these privateers brought up no less than 37 Danes, 36 Norwegians, and 75 Swedes, together with 18 of Slesvig-Holstein - figures which aroused turmoil in the colleges of commerce at Copenhagen and Stockholm¹¹⁴, and which enable us to see Zeeland's fifty odd arrests in clearer perspective¹¹⁵. In the Nine Years War, again in 1703-1705, neutrals had less to fear from Dunkirk itself. Dutch part-owners or freighters, with their strong interest in Scandinavian bottoms, must have been aware of that.

Perhaps they also understood that the notorious 'Nest of Pyrates'¹¹⁶ was not without troubles of its own. As reflected in the reports of the Dunkirk captains, there were ten mediocre campaigns for every successful one: long is the tale of sprung masts and parted cables, of guns and boats jettisoned in flight, of strikes and mutinies. Prize crews were grudgingly spared and many captures proved ephemeral, the Ostend capers habitually recovering them around the banks during the Nine Years War¹¹⁷ and again after the capitulation of Ostend in July 1706; subsequently the French caught 31 of them. But here is a warning not to equate interceptions with the far lower numbers of prizes condemned. So is the action of the admiralty courts of Bergen and Christiansand in sometimes restoring prizes taken by Dunkirkers in Norwegian waters or simply brought in there without good reason, although Bonrepaus used his influence to get these cases reconsidered at

114. PRO, SP 75/25, Vernon to Hedges, 9 June, 15 Sept., 27 Oct. o.s.; SP 95/16, Jackson to Hedges, 27 Aug. 1704, enclosing a protest from 49 Stockholm burghers, complaining of excessive legal costs, 'unheard of and unreasonable Interrogatories', pillage and damage to cargoes, so that these were often 'hardly worth the freight and custom afterwards'. The figures have been collected from the prize papers in HCA 32/45-92. Not all these prizes were restored *quoad navem* or *quoad bona*, or both; *ibidem* 47/21 and 48/6. Cf. G. N. Clark, 'Neutral Commerce in the War of the Spanish Succession and the Treaty of Utrecht', *British Year Book of International Law* (1928) 69-83; but it is erroneous to state that these ships were detained only when outward bound (*ibidem*, 72).

115. For all the national and international fuss they aroused, I can find in the minutes of the Zeeland admiralty board traces of not more than fifty neutral and Allied cases in 1703-1705, the period of crisis. Some were admittedly protracted and releases often occurred only after a composition out of court between the parties. While the board favoured this procedure, it was alive to the danger of collusion. It was disciplined, like the captors themselves, by the 'Placaat noopende de Commissievaarders' of 28 July 1705 in Cau, *Groot Placaet-Boeck*, V, 306-310), which reserved the grant of commissions to the States General: summary in my chapter on Jacob Sautijn, *William III and Louis XIV*, 170-171.

116. *Defoe's Review*, no. 52, 27 July o.s. 1708 (New York, Facsimile Text Soc., 1938, V, 20).

117. In a letter from Dunkirk to Valincour, secretary to the *Conseil des Prises*, 16 June 1696, Vauban assessed the number at two out of three.

Copenhagen: no business, he said, gave him so much trouble¹¹⁸. In fortified harbours like Bergen, the *amtmann* might send his soldiers on board a prize and there would be friction; alternatively, the captors might seduce Norwegian magistrates and merchants with cheap prize goods, which in turn paid for fresh provisions or a refit¹¹⁹. This might be contrary to Denmark's Convention of 1691 with the Maritime Powers, who eventually (in 1701) applied enough pressure to stop the practice¹²⁰, with the result that the Dunkirkers henceforward were to find it harder to pay their bills: a diplomatic success that has not received due recognition, and one that well illustrates how effectively the writ of Copenhagen now ran in Norway, try as might the King of Denmark and Norway to be all things to all powers. In the Spanish war, the corsairs were more discreet, making less use of their Norwegian refuges and avoiding fortified harbours, though partly perhaps because they then sailed more frequently into the English Channel¹²¹. This shift certainly made for better dividends at Dunkirk, especially at the height of the privateering war in 1707¹²². Nevertheless, the turnover among its promoters, the *dépositaires* (*boekhouders*) was high. There were at least 127 of them between 1688 and 1697, but few stayed the course for long and there were bankruptcies among those who did¹²³.

118. Johnsen, *Innberetninger*, 184 and *passim*.

119. Bergen was the best market; in 1693, according to Bonrepaus, there was competition there to buy them (*ibidem*, 94). For a summary of violent incidents, see AN, Marine B³ 142, fos. 318-319.

120. *Ibidem*, 181-182, 192, 215, 221. Article iii of the Treaty of Odense (20 Jan. 1701) between Denmark and the Maritime Powers forbade the King's 'ports and rivers' to all warships other than convoys. The Convention of 1691 had gone no further than prohibit the taking of prizes on the coasts. Denmark tried unsuccessfully to neutralize the entire Kattegat and a belt 5 or 6 leagues wide between Lindesness and Trondheim; the coast of Jutland was dangerous enough to neutralize itself to a distance of 4 or 5 German leagues (Johnsen, *Innberetninger*, 38-39, 52).

121. AN, Marine C⁴ 268, 272-273, 276 ('décl. de capitaines'). Forbin's violation of territorial waters near Vardø in 1707 and Admiral Norris's seizure of cornships in the Kattegat, in 1709, greatly embarrassed the Danish Court: Johnsen, *Innberetninger*, 279-284, 287-289; PRO, SP 75/27, Pulteney to Boyle 13 and 20 July 1709.

122. I have attempted a provisional assessment in a paper contributed to Michel Mollat and Ulane Bonnel, edd., *Course et piraterie: études présentées à la Commission Internationale d'Histoire Maritime à l'occasion de son XVe colloque international ... San Francisco, août 1975* (Paris: Ed. du Centre Nat. de la Recherche Scientifique, 1975, in roneo) 231-270. Bonrepaus considered that the habit of visiting Norway favoured the pockets of captains to the prejudice of their investors: Johnsen, *Innberetninger*, 170.

123. Notably Jacques Plets and Guillaume Taverne, brother of Nicolas, who was far and away the most successful of all Dunkirk armateurs, remaining in the business throughout the wars; Jan Rycx, his associate in over 50 armaments down to 1695, fades out at this point. A dozen insolvencies are minuted in AN, G⁵ 16⁷, 'Etat de ce qui est deub au greffe de l'Admirauté de Dunquerque', 26 March 1702. The *dépositaires* are precisely known for the periods Sept. 1688-June 1689 and Feb. 1690-May 1695 from surviving *actes de caution* in AN, Marine C⁴ 253, 255, 257, 259; otherwise their names have to be gleaned from the 'déclarations des capitaines', a series with gaps for Sept. 1689-March 1693, Jan.-Oct. 1695, May 1702-July 1703, Oct. 1704-Feb. 1707. The functions of a *dépositaire* resembled those of a Dutch *boekhouder*, for which see J. R. Bruijn, 'Kaaopvaart in de tweede en derde Engelse oorlog', *Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden*, XC (1975) 408-429.

Although the majority are described as 'marchands' in the capitation rolls, and a few were members of the magistracy, they include an assortment of innkeepers, brewers, apothecaries, surgeons, brokers, naval officers, pursers, shipmasters, ship's carpenters and sailmakers, notaries and *commis des traites*. Even the men of substance among them were constantly complaining - of the high wages and flightiness of seamen, of their king's tolerance of enemy traders, and the obstructiveness (or worse) of their local *amirauté*, with which they conducted a running quarrel¹²⁴.

But what captains! In fighting quality, Mattheus de Wulf, Cornelis Meijnne, Crombrughe and Simoens, Saus and Baeteman, the Glasson brothers, the Bart family, and a hundred others, were opponents worthy of the Zeelanders, in some cases related to them and schooled like them (through Jean Bart) in the tradition of De Ruyter. What seamanship, what patience and ruse and sometimes bullying - chasing a hundred sail for every ten visited and searched (if not boarded with cutlass and small arms), zig-zagging from coast to coast as the winds dictated, joining and parting company from sunset to sunset, infiltrating convoys before dawn, scrutinizing like learned doctors the papers of the innocent and guilty alike, bargaining for ransoms and setting fire to the obstinate, removing here a few barrels of butter or herring and there a spare sail or cable, pillaging the money and personal possessions of passengers, anchoring in dead water on the Dogger Bank or judging the tidal caprices of Pentland Firth. At times, as in 1695-1696, the nimbler ones penetrated the inland waters of the Dutch Republic and notably between the Wadden islands and the Friesland shore, notwithstanding the death penalty placarded by the States General on 24 February 1696¹²⁵; in 1708 we find the Amelanders seeking neutral status¹²⁶. Evidently, the 'nuisance value' of the capers, if that is all it was, is not to be calculated in terms of prizes and ransoms alone.

It will bear repeating, lastly, that so long as the French king's base in the North Sea, on which he spent so much, sheltered even a modest naval squadron, no Zee-

124. AN, G⁵ 164 and Marine B³ 60, fos. 68-75; 81, fos. 12-13, 43, 55, 69, 264-265; 133, fos. 14-15; 142, fos. 629-634.

125. De Jonge, *Nederlandsche zeevezen*, III, 465-466. Examples from 1696, post-dating the *plakkaat*, in AN, Marine C⁴ 263, fos. 71-72, 75, 116 (all 'dans les Wattes'); for 1695, *ibidem* 258, fo. 115 ('entre Vlie et Texel'), 144v.-145 ('devant Zélande'), 208v.-209 ('proche d'Amelandt'), 234v. ('dans les bancs de Flessingues'); and for 1704, *ibidem* 268, fos. 11v.-16 (Ems), 153 ('rivière de Mildebourg'), 223 ('dans la Meuse'). Cf. *ibidem*, fo. 237, for a petition of several merchants of Colchester, asking that Capt. Jan Tilly be kept prisoner till the end of the war, 'attendu que ledit capitaine Tilly a tousjours fait le commerce des huîtres en temps de paix avec eux et par conséquent qu'il a une entière connoissance des endroits de la rivière de Londres où ils ont des bastimens ...'. The specialist in these exploits was the eccentric Louis Ile Mel, for whom see Malo, *Grande Guerre*, 178-203.

126. AN, F¹² 54, fo. 137.

lander and no Englander would ever be free from the nightmare of a 'descent', especially while Scotland's allegiance hung in the balance. That the alarms of 1696 and 1708 came to nothing should not mislead us. Rumours of preparations long preceded them and it was anyone's guess what their objective was. When Forbin came out with the Pretender in 1708, there was a run on the Bank of England, not for the first time; but panic too in Zeeland and Rotterdam¹²⁷. Men waited for the new or the full moon, and kept an anxious eye on their weather-cocks.

127. Sir John Clapham, *The Bank of England* (2 vols, Cambridge, 1944) I, 62; Snyder, *Marlborough-Godolphin Correspondence*, II, 1028; Stork-Penning, *Het grote werk*, 145, 184-185.

De ontwikkeling van de nationalistische beweging in Nederlands-Indië

Recensieartikel door I. J. Brugmans

R. C. Kwantes, *De ontwikkeling van de nationalistische beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië. Bronnenpublicatie, Eerste stuk, 1917-medio 1923* (Uitgaven van de commissie voor bronnenpublicatie betreffende de geschiedenis van Nederlandsch-Indië 1900-1942 van het Nederlands Historisch Genootschap, VIII; Groningen, H. D. Tjeenk Willink, 1975, xxxv + 625 blz.)-

Dit boek sluit aan bij publicatie no IV (1967) van bovengenoemde commissie, waarin prof. dr. S. L. van der Wal de bronnen betreffende de opkomst van de nationalistische beweging heeft doen afdrukken. De titel, die drs. Kwantes aan zijn werk heeft geschonken, geeft de inhoud niet zuiver weer: het is het regeringsbeleid ten aanzien van die beweging, dat hier behandeling vindt. Anderzijds heeft de bewerker het begrip 'nationalistische beweging' ruim genomen in die zin, dat hij ook de maatregelen ter beteugeling van excessen als bijvoorbeeld persdelicten en misbruik van het vergaderrecht in zijn boek heeft opgenomen, evenals de ontwikkeling van de vakbeweging en de daarbij behorende beperking van het stakingsrecht. Deze verruiming verdient slechts toejuiching. Alle documenten zijn geput uit het archief van het voormalige ministerie van koloniën; aanvullingen, belangrijke soms, werden verkregen uit de particuliere archieven van mr. Th. B. Pleyte, mr. J. P. graaf Van Limburg Stirum en R. A. Kern.

De wijze van presentatie der documenten is zonder voorbehoud voortreffelijk te noemen. De bewerker heeft het dogma van de chronologische volgorde waar het pas gaf overtreden, door adviezen over één bepaalde zaak bijeen te voegen; de overzichtelijkheid wordt hiermee gediend. De annotatie is uitvoerig, meestal in de vorm van soms lange citaten uit stukken die niet werden opgenomen. Enkele malen hebben ook verwijzingen naar de betrekkelijk schaarse literatuur plaats. Het is duidelijk dat de bewerker de materie volkomen beheerst blijkens de toelichtende voetnoten die noch te veel, noch te weinig bieden¹. Uitgebreide registers verhogen de bruikbaarheid van de publicatie.

'Het is niet de taak van de bewerker, de uit te geven tekst in de inleiding wetenschappelijk te verwerken': aldus luidt punt 45 van de in 1975 verschenen *Richtlijnen voor het uitgeven van historische bescheiden*. De heer Kwantes heeft zich strikt aan deze richtlijn gehouden; zijn inleiding is slechts een verantwoording van de bronnen waaruit is geput en voor de wijze van uitgave daarvan. Voor de recensent geldt dit voorschrift uiteraard niet. Daarom volgen thans enkele kanttekeningen, waartoe de lezing van de documenten aanleiding heeft gegeven. Meer dan kanttekeningen kunnen het niet zijn, alleen al omdat nog twee

1. De enige misvatting, die te constateren valt, is te vinden in noot 24 op blz. 511, waar de bewerker de chilafat (of chalifah) -beweging in verband brengt met de afschaffing van het kalifaat in Turkije. De bedoelde beweging, die haar oorsprong vond in Egypte, had hiermede niets te maken. Zie *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1911, 1^e druk) 770 in voce Chalifa.